Security/Reviews/Firefox/AppsSync

Items to be reviewed

Apps Sync

Introduce Feature

Goal of Feature, what is trying to be achieved (problem solved, use cases, etc)

• sync apps installed by the navigator.mozApps API between sync enabled devices
• in JS in sync, running as chrome priv
• diff devices with diff applications (fx, fennec, b2g)
  • tries to install
  • no explicit UX for any part of this - the user is not prompted
• this will apply only to apps installed from a http or https origin
• this sync feature does sync across devices (desktop -> mobile)
• there's a sync preference / check box to opt out of this

What solutions/approaches were considered other than the proposed solution?

Why was this solution chosen?

Any security threats already considered in the design and why?=

• The feature follows the same security model as other sync engines: add-on records are encrypted using the Sync Key and the IDs for each add-on are randomly generated.

Threat Brainstorming

• Attacker with access to your sync account could silently push apps to your sync clients
  • is this a sync problem or a problem for this feature?
    • a problem introduced by the feature. Before this feature, an attacker could only push bookmarks/history to your sync devices.

Conclusions / Action Items