Fingerprinting - Revision history

Tritter at 18:25, 12 May 2026

2026-05-12T18:25:54Z

Tritter at 18:31, 15 April 2026

2026-04-15T18:31:14Z

@@ Line 9: / Line 9: @@
 <li> Source Docs on the implementation: https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/toolkit/components/resistfingerprinting/resistfingerprinting/implementation.html
 </ul>
 == Desktop ==

Tritter at 18:25, 15 April 2026

2026-04-15T18:25:54Z

@@ Line 98: / Line 98: @@
 | {{bug|1825250}} (Nightly-only in 118–119 due to {{bug|1849903}})
 |-
-| colspan="3" | Regressions: {{bug|1887161}} (canvas getImageData slow in PBM on maps/Airbnb, fixed via SipHash in 134 then superseded by EfficientCanvasRandomization); {{bug|2025570}} (Google Maps Baseline, shared with EfficientCanvasRandomization)
+| colspan="3" | Regressions: {{bug|1852541}} (Google Meet can't join, fixed 120); {{bug|1876149}} (onshape.com getImageData); {{bug|1882761}} (Google Maps highway symbols); {{bug|1887161}} (canvas getImageData slow in PBM on maps/Airbnb, fixed via SipHash in 134 then superseded by EfficientCanvasRandomization); {{bug|1905884}} (visual bugs on canvas-heavy sites); {{bug|1957426}} (meta); {{bug|1957427}} (wpt.fyi image comparison, fixed via overrides); {{bug|2010274}} (SoundCloud audio waveform broken in PBM/ETP Strict); {{bug|2025570}} (Google Maps Baseline, shared with EfficientCanvasRandomization)
 |}
@@ Line 167: / Line 216: @@
 | {{bug|1825250}} (Nightly-only in 118–119 due to {{bug|1849903}})
 |-
-| colspan="3" | Regressions: {{bug|1887161}}
+| colspan="3" | Regressions: {{bug|1852541}} (Google Meet can't join, fixed 120); {{bug|1876149}} (onshape.com getImageData); {{bug|1882761}} (Google Maps highway symbols); {{bug|1887161}} (canvas getImageData slow in PBM, fixed via SipHash in 134 then superseded by EfficientCanvasRandomization); {{bug|1905884}} (visual bugs on canvas-heavy sites); {{bug|1957426}} (meta); {{bug|1957427}} (wpt.fyi image comparison, fixed via overrides)
 |}

Tritter at 18:08, 15 April 2026

2026-04-15T18:08:43Z

@@ Line 78: / Line 78: @@
 |-
 | colspan="3" | Regressions: {{bug|2025570}} (Google Maps highway labels broken, fixed via RemoteSettings in 150/151)
 |}
@@ Line 130: / Line 151: @@
 | 145
 | {{bug|1993304}}
 |}

Tritter at 17:58, 15 April 2026

2026-04-15T17:58:16Z

Show changes

Tritter at 17:08, 15 April 2026

2026-04-15T17:08:25Z

Show changes

Tantek: more than 8 years since anyone touched this, mark historical

2025-01-08T00:04:38Z

more than 8 years since anyone touched this, mark historical

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:04, 8 January 2025
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			{{historical}}

	= Overview =		= Overview =

Fmarier: Link to equivalent Chromium list

2016-02-22T18:11:38Z

Link to equivalent Chromium list

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:11, 22 February 2016
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	"After plugins and plugin-provided information, we believe that the HTML5 Canvas is the single largest fingerprinting threat browsers face today." - Tor Project.		"After plugins and plugin-provided information, we believe that the HTML5 Canvas is the single largest fingerprinting threat browsers face today." - Tor Project.
	Original research: [http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/canvas.pdf Pixel Perfect: Fingerprinting Canvas in HTML5], demo: [https://www.browserleaks.com/canvas HTML5 Canvas Fingerprinting].		Original research: [http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/canvas.pdf Pixel Perfect: Fingerprinting Canvas in HTML5], demo: [https://www.browserleaks.com/canvas HTML5 Canvas Fingerprinting].

			= See Also =

			* [http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/client-identification-mechanisms Chromium's list of client identification mechanisms]

Cpeterson: /* Plugins */ Rewrite plugin fingerprinting section to describe Firefox 28's navigator.plugins"cloaking"

2014-01-07T07:10:14Z

Plugins: Rewrite plugin fingerprinting section to describe Firefox 28's navigator.plugins"cloaking"

@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 The PluginDetect JS library was used to check for 8 common plugins on that platform, plus extra code to estimate the Acrobat Reader version. Data sent by AJAX post.
-IE does not allow enumeration via <code>navigator.plugins</code>. We could follow suit here ([https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=757726 bug 757726]). A short list could be brute-forced by simply including several plugin-specific objects in a page. I'm not sure what can be done about that, other than perhaps limiting the number of plugin types a page can display?
+IE does not allow enumeration via <code>navigator.plugins[]</code>. Starting in Firefox 28 ([https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=757726 bug 757726]), Firefox restricts which plugins are visible to content enumerating <code>navigator.plugins[]</code>. This change does not disable any plugins; it just hides some plugin names from enumeration. Websites can still check whether a particular hidden plugin is installed by directly querying <code>navigator.plugins[]</code> like <code>navigator.plugins["Silverlight Plug-In"]</code>.
 == Fonts ==

Twn: /* Extra credit */ canvas fix

2013-03-10T03:30:52Z

Extra credit: canvas fix

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:30, 10 March 2013
Line 91:		Line 91:

	Examples:		Examples:
	:HTML5 Canvas: "After plugins and plugin-provided information, we believe that the HTML5 Canvas is the single largest fingerprinting threat browsers face today." - Tor Project. ([http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/canvas.pdf Pixel Perfect: Fingerprinting Canvas in HTML5], [https://www.browserleaks.com/canvas HTML5 Canvas Fingerprinting]).

	== Other data acquired via plugins ==		== Other data acquired via plugins ==
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	Things like geolocation, database access and such require the user to grant permission for a given site. For geolocation, this is done with an infobar. We should do everything we can to make it clear to users what they're providing, and give them centralized control of those permissions in the privacy panel. This is what the UX privacy proposals seek to do.		Things like geolocation, database access and such require the user to grant permission for a given site. For geolocation, this is done with an infobar. We should do everything we can to make it clear to users what they're providing, and give them centralized control of those permissions in the privacy panel. This is what the UX privacy proposals seek to do.

			== HTML5 Canvas ==

			"After plugins and plugin-provided information, we believe that the HTML5 Canvas is the single largest fingerprinting threat browsers face today." - Tor Project.
			Original research: [http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/canvas.pdf Pixel Perfect: Fingerprinting Canvas in HTML5], demo: [https://www.browserleaks.com/canvas HTML5 Canvas Fingerprinting].