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If a CA controls all the domains that use their root certificate, then they probably do not meet the criteria for inclusion in Mozilla's root store. [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ Mozilla's CA Certificate Policy] states: "We will determine which CA certificates are included in software products distributed by Mozilla, based on the benefits and risks of such inclusion to typical users of those products." With ALL affected domains under your control, your root certificate would not seem to create a benefit for typical Mozilla users, only for users of your services. Perhaps a better alternative is to be a [[CA/Intermediate_Certificates|subordinate CA]] of a CA who is already [[CA/Included_Certificates|included in Mozilla's root store]]. It is the CA's responsibility to justify why their root certificate needs to be included in Mozilla's root store and explain how the inclusion will benefit typical Mozilla users.
Having a root certificate you control included in Mozilla's root store is a significant ongoing responsibility; it is '''not''' a one-time trivial effort. It means that, in the normal case, the world will trust you to correctly issue digital certificates identifying any website. There will be associated costs in maintaining the required security infrastructure and having it audited on a yearly basis. After a CA has a certificate included in Mozilla's root store, it is expected that the CA will continue to be aware of [https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/mozilla.dev.security.policy ongoing discussions] and updates to [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ Mozilla's Root Store Policy]. The CA is required to send regular updates to Mozilla via the [http://ccadb.org/ Common CA Database (CCADB)], including annual updates to their policy and audit documentation.
= Process Overview =
