Security/WebAPI/Web Telephony

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Project Info

Web Telephony
Project Page	https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebTelephony
Next Milestone	Target Milestone: --- → mozilla12
Security Resource	Paul Theriault

{{#set:Component=Web Telephony |Project=https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebTelephony |Milestone=Target Milestone: --- → mozilla12 |Resource=Paul Theriault }}

Security Information

Status:	OK
Securtiy Approved for Beta Launch?:	No
Data Flow Diagram:	`
Threat Model:	`
Bugs:	https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726
Security Review:	`
Final Security Approval:	no

{{#set:Sectrackerstatus=OK |Simpyn=No |DFD=` |TM=` |bugs=https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726 |Secreview=` |SecTrackerFSA=no }}

Background

Goals

• allow web content to dial out
• allow content to mediate incoming calls (accept/reject/merge)
• allow content to query transceiver state

Bug:

• B2G Meta telephony bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=699235
• Web Telephony meta bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726

Pages:

• https://wiki.mozilla.org/B2G/RIL
• Detailed code walkthrough for receive call case: https://wiki.mozilla.org/B2G/Architecture#RIL:_Telephony
• http://hacks.mozilla.org/2012/03/webtelephony-api-and-websms-api-part-of-webapi/

Changeset

• https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/mozilla-inbound/rev/bac673bc7211

Source:

• http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/telephony/
• https://github.com/mozilla-b2g/android-hardware-ril/blob/master/include/telephony/ril.h

Data Flow Diagram

TDB

Answered Questions

• Do pages have direct access to the audio streams of a phone call?
  • No
• Can another application record audio while a call is underway?
  • Not sure, but probably not. Currently no, since no API to access audiostreams.
• Are the audio streams buffered anywhere on disk or is there any local record of the call (if so, what data is stored)?
  • Not stored on disk at all. API doesn't store any records, although Gaia app would be expected to do so.

Threat Model

ID	Title	Threat	Proposed Mitigations	Threat Agent	Rating	Likelihood	Notes	Impact	Notes
1	Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API	A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements	App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)	Malicious web content	?	Requires a bug in broader browser security model			Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy probably would have broader implications
2	Attack from radio network	Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack.	Code review Fuzzing	Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets	?	?	?
3	Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability	A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash.	Code review Fuzzing Limiting access to API	Malicious web content			?		Dangerous since it involves privileged code
4	Content spoofing phones dialer app	Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack	Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed) Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages	Malicious web content			?
5	Content framing the dialer app	If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.	Broader B2G issue Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages	Malicious web content

Authorization Model

• TBD

Implementation Requirements

• TBD