Security/WebAPI/Web Telephony: Difference between revisions

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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes'''
| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes'''
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| 1||Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API||A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements ||* App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs * B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)||Malicious web content||?||Requires a bug in broader browser security model||||||\"* Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls
| 1||Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API||A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements ||* App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs * B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)||Malicious web content||?||Requires a bug in broader browser security model||||||
* Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls
* Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy
* Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy
* probably would have broader implications
* probably would have broader implications
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| 2||Attack from radio network||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack.||* Code review * Fuzzing||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets||?||?||?||||
| 2||Attack from radio network||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack.||* Code review * Fuzzing||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets||?||?||?||||
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| 3||Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability ||A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash.||* Code review* Fuzzing* Limiting access to API||Malicious web content||||||?||||*Dangerous since it involves privileged code
| 3||Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability ||A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash.||* Code review* Fuzzing* Limiting access to API||Malicious web content||||||?||||
*Dangerous since it involves privileged code
|-
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| 3||Content spoofing phones dialer app||Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack||*Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||?||||
| 3||Content spoofing phones dialer app||Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack||
*Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||?||||
|-
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| 4||Content framing the dialer app||If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.||* Broader B2G issue* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||
| 4||Content framing the dialer app||If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.||
* Broader B2G issue
* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||
|}
|}

Revision as of 21:16, 5 April 2012

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Project Info

Web Telephony
Project Page https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebTelephony
Next Milestone Target Milestone: --- → mozilla12
Security Resource Paul Theriault

{{#set:Component=Web Telephony |Project=https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebTelephony |Milestone=Target Milestone: --- → mozilla12 |Resource=Paul Theriault }}

Security Information

Status: OK
Securtiy Approved for Beta Launch?: No
Data Flow Diagram: `
Threat Model: `
Bugs: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726
Security Review: `
Final Security Approval: no

{{#set:Sectrackerstatus=OK |Simpyn=No |DFD=` |TM=` |bugs=https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726 |Secreview=` |SecTrackerFSA=no }}

Background

Goals

  • allow web content to dial out
  • allow content to mediate incoming calls (accept/reject/merge)
  • allow content to query transceiver state

Bug:

Articles:

Changeset

Source:

Data Flow Diagram

TDB

Open Questions

  • Do pages have direct access to the audio streams of a phone call? (from the code it seems not?)

Threat Model

ID Title Threat Proposed Mitigations Threat Agent Rating Likelihood Notes Impact Notes
1 Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements * App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs * B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level) Malicious web content ? Requires a bug in broader browser security model
  • Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls
  • Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy
  • probably would have broader implications
2 Attack from radio network Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack. * Code review * Fuzzing Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets ? ? ?
3 Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash. * Code review* Fuzzing* Limiting access to API Malicious web content ?
  • Dangerous since it involves privileged code
3 Content spoofing phones dialer app Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack
  • Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||?||||
4 Content framing the dialer app If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.
  • Broader B2G issue
  • Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||