Security/WebAPI/Web Telephony
Project Info
| Web Telephony | |
| Project Page | https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebTelephony |
| Next Milestone | Target Milestone: --- → mozilla12 |
| Security Resource | Paul Theriault |
{{#set:Component=Web Telephony |Project=https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebAPI/WebTelephony |Milestone=Target Milestone: --- → mozilla12 |Resource=Paul Theriault }}
Security Information
| Status: | OK |
| Securtiy Approved for Beta Launch?: | No |
| Data Flow Diagram: | ` |
| Threat Model: | ` |
| Bugs: | https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726 |
| Security Review: | ` |
| Final Security Approval: | no |
{{#set:Sectrackerstatus=OK |Simpyn=No |DFD=` |TM=` |bugs=https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726 |Secreview=` |SecTrackerFSA=no }}
Background
Goals
- allow web content to dial out
- allow content to mediate incoming calls (accept/reject/merge) *allow content to query transceiver state
Bug:
- B2G Meta telephony bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=699235
- Web Telephony meta bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726
Articles:
- http://hacks.mozilla.org/2012/03/webtelephony-api-and-websms-api-part-of-webapi/
- Detailed code walkthrough for receive call case: https://wiki.mozilla.org/B2G/Architecture#RIL:_Telephony
Changeset
Source:
- http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/telephony/
- https://github.com/mozilla-b2g/android-hardware-ril/blob/master/include/telephony/ril.h
Data Flow Diagram
TDB
Threat Model
| ID | Title | Threat | Proposed Mitigations | Threat Agent | Rating | Likelihood | Notes | Impact | Notes |
| 1 | Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API | A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements | \* App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs
\* B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)||Malicious web content||||Requires a bug in broader browser security model||||||\* Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls \* Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy \* probably would have broader implications | ||||||
| 2 | Attack from radio network | Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack. | \* Code review
\* Fuzzing |
Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets | |||||
| 3 | Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability | A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash. | \* Code review
\* Fuzzing \* Limiting access to API||Malicious web content||||||||||\*Dangerous since it involves privileged code | ||||||
| 3 | Content spoofing phones dialer app | Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack | \*Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)
\* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content|||||||||| | ||||||
| 4 | Content framing the dialer app | If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call. | \* Broader B2G issue
\* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content|||||||||| |