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Services/Sync/P2P Key Exchange And Rotation: Difference between revisions
Services/Sync/P2P Key Exchange And Rotation (view source)
Revision as of 02:48, 4 January 2016
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===Messaging Protocol=== | ===Messaging Protocol=== | ||
<span id=" | <span id="Messaging_Protocol_v2"></span> | ||
By first requiring each party to make a hash commitment an adversary is required to select a public key without knowing the other party’s key. Thus making it very difficult to launch a MITM attack without detection. See [[#Registration Protocol v2]] | By first requiring each party to make a hash commitment an adversary is required to select a public key without knowing the other party’s key. Thus making it very difficult to launch a MITM attack without detection. See [[#Registration Protocol v2]] | ||
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</pre> | </pre> | ||
=== Registration Protocol | === Registration Protocol === | ||
<span id="Registration_Protocol_v2"></span> | |||
The objective of the registration protocol is for a user, i.e. Alice, to authorise a new device and transfer to it the master key (sync key) thus allowing it to read and write encrypted data to and from the storage. To maintain the security of the master key the protocol must defend against a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack from an adversary. Importantly for version 2 of the eXfio Peer protocol the starting assumption is that an adversary has full access to the storage '''and''' knows the password, i.e. a hostile systems administrator. | The objective of the registration protocol is for a user, i.e. Alice, to authorise a new device and transfer to it the master key (sync key) thus allowing it to read and write encrypted data to and from the storage. To maintain the security of the master key the protocol must defend against a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack from an adversary. Importantly for version 2 of the eXfio Peer protocol the starting assumption is that an adversary has full access to the storage '''and''' knows the password, i.e. a hostile systems administrator. | ||
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</pre> | </pre> | ||
===Key Rotation Protocol | ===Key Rotation Protocol=== | ||
<span id="Key_Rotation_Protocol_v2"></span> | |||
TODO | TODO | ||