Security/Reviews/WebRT: Difference between revisions

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|SecReview target=<ul>
|SecReview target=<ul>
<li> Feature Page: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/WebRT
<li> Feature Page: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/WebRT
<li>{{bug|697006}}
<li>{{bug|697006}}: enable mozApps API
<li>{{bug|731541}}: Windows installer
<li>{{bug|739636}}: Mac installer
<li>{{bug|725408}}: launcher and shell
<li>[https://etherpad.mozilla.org/bug-725408 etherpad bug-725408]: scratchpad for responding to review comments
<li>[https://etherpad.mozilla.org/webapprt-install-flow etherpad webapprt-install-flow]: install flow specification
</ul>
</ul>
}}
}}
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The "scope"  of a web app is an origin (protocol+host+port). In the future we might allow the app to specify that it will want to load Facebook or Paypal in order to do a third-party thing temporarily.
The "scope"  of a web app is an origin (protocol+host+port). In the future we might allow the app to specify that it will want to load Facebook or Paypal in order to do a third-party thing temporarily.
|SecReview alt solutions=* using firefox.exe shortcuts (discussed above)
|SecReview alt solutions=* using firefox.exe shortcuts (discussed above)
|SecReview solution chosen=* for a variety of reasons shown in the discussion above
|SecReview solution chosen=* for a variety of reasons shown in the discussion above
|SecReview threats considered=* web apps whose name contains ".."
|SecReview threats considered=* web apps whose name contains ".."
|SecReview threat brainstorming=* Does the stub get updated when Firefox is updated?
** No. We just hope the attack surface is small enough that it's ok to update them when they run.
* What happens if arguments are passed to the stub on the command line?
** ... and the stub executable decides to update itself, right then
* Stub executables cannot be signed, because the icon is smushed into the executable. Will this cause Windows to warn or block the executable?
** it can be set to do so, but by default it will warn on execution if the sig is wrong
* Are there domain restrictions on what a web app can load?  (links used to open in firefox, does that still happen? What about changes to window.location?)
* Do web apps share a cookie store with Firefox?
** no
* Does each app have a competely separate profile?
** Yes
* What permissions do these web apps have?
** currently nothing beyond what a webpage has.  they load in a type="content"
*** except for the ability to appear without a url bar, ...
* web apps whose name is the same as an app the user already has installed (spoofing, overwriting)
** given the way refrenced this should not be a problem
* finding libxul.dll in the working directory (make sure we use the new, secure version of the dll search path)
* Spoofing Facebook or Paypal logins. User has no way to tell if it's legit.  Can we say "BrowserID logins only", or send it over to the web browser?
* Can a web app change its icon on the fly? (Suddenly spoofing Firefox or Windows Update, for example)\
}}
}}
{{SecReviewActionStatus
{{SecReviewActionStatus
|SecReview action item status=None
|SecReview action item status=In Progress
|SecReview action items=<table border="1">
<tr>
<td>Who</td>
        <td>bug</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>By When</td>
<td>Completed date
{{new|new}}
{{done|Done}}
{{miss|Miss}}
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myk </td>
        <td>{{bug|741954}}</td>
<td>navigating "off origin" needs to open in browser </td>
<td> by ship</td>
<td>{{new|new}} </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myk </td>
        <td><strike>{{bug|741955}}</strike> {{bug|707836}}</td>
<td>if whitelisted 3rd party pages/domains are allowed those need to be clearly identified in chrome when they're opened </td>
<td>by ship </td>
<td>{{new|new}} </td>
</tr>
</table>
<bugzilla>
{
"id":"741954,707836"
}
</bugzilla>
}}
}}
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