Confirmed users
502
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Gdestuynder (talk | contribs) (Added threat 8) |
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[https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/ID_and_Payments#Payments_Data_Flow_Diagram Data Flow Diagrams] | [https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/ID_and_Payments#Payments_Data_Flow_Diagram Data Flow Diagrams] | ||
==== Data | ==== Data Type Definition ==== | ||
[https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/ID_and_Payments#Payments_Data_Types Data Types] | [https://wiki.mozilla.org/Apps/ID_and_Payments#Payments_Data_Types Data Types] | ||
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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes''' | | align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes''' | ||
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| | | 1||Compromise AMO database||Currently, customer's paypal information resides in the AMO database. If the AMO database is compromised this would include paypal information.||Separation of payment data from the rest of AMO. Incident response process to include communication with payal to disable pre-auth keys. Proper CEF logging key.||Skilled Attacker||12||3||4 – Reputation||for an actual compromise, this would require the paypal API key as well. | ||
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| | | 2||malicious access to apps device ||If a phone is stolen or given to a friend/family member, it is possible for that person to make purchases.||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal wiht stolen phone.||Malicious User||12||3||4 – Reputation||In other systems (i.e. iOS, this i a configured parameter. | ||
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| | | 3||Malicious extension could steal browserid credentials ||A rogue extension could possibly steal credentials or cause transactions to happen.||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials.||Malicious Developer||12||3||4 – Reputation||It is not possible to siphon funds to any paypal account. Must be registered with marketplace. | ||
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| 4||Malicious App creates fake iframe ||An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe. ||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. ||Malicious App||12||3||4 – Reputation|| | |||
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| 5||Malicious App creates fake iframe ||An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe. ||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. ||Malicious App||12||3||4 – Reputation|| | | 5||Malicious App creates fake iframe ||An app could create an iframe in order to overlay a purchase iframe. ||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. ||Malicious App||12||3||4 – Reputation|| | ||
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| 6|| | | 6||XSS vuln could allow malicious user to force purchase ||If a XSS is found in the marketplace, this could be used to force a purchase. ||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. enable CSP on the marketplace site. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. ||Malicious App||12||3||4 – Reputation|| | ||
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| 7|| | | 7||CSRF could force purchase. ||If a XSS is found in the marketplace, this could be used to force a purchase. ||A PIN is to be implemented that is required for purchases and in-app purchases. enable CSRF protection token on the marketplace site. CEF logging on transactions to track excessive purchases. Incident response to deal with stolen credentials. Paypal account shows all purchases. ||Malicious App||12||3||4 – Reputation|| | ||
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| 8|| | | 8||Compromise AMO web-heads ||An attacker able to run arbitrary code on the AMO web-heads can indirectly sign arbitrary web applications that are in the review queue (any web application that passed the automated scan) via the celery service. The attacker can also directly sign a web application by requesting the signing from the signing service, without any further check.||Mitigation possibilities are being discussed.||System access||12||3||4 – Reputation|| | ||
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