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Services/Sync/P2P Key Exchange And Rotation: Difference between revisions
Services/Sync/P2P Key Exchange And Rotation (view source)
Revision as of 05:07, 4 January 2016
, 4 January 2016Fixed section link
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<span id="Messaging_Protocol_v2"></span> | <span id="Messaging_Protocol_v2"></span> | ||
===Messaging Protocol=== | ===Messaging Protocol=== | ||
By requiring the responding party, Bob, to nominate a key in advance using a hash commitment, a MITM adversary, Eve, is required to select a public key without knowing the either Alice key. Thus making it very difficult to launch a MITM attack without detection. See [[#Registration_Protocol_2]] | By requiring the responding party, Bob, to nominate a key in advance using a hash commitment, a MITM adversary, Eve, is required to select a public key without knowing the either Alice key. Thus making it very difficult to launch a MITM attack without detection. See [[#Registration_Protocol_2|Registration Protocol]] | ||
'''Protocol Sequence''' | '''Protocol Sequence''' | ||
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<span id="Registration_Protocol_v2"></span> | <span id="Registration_Protocol_v2"></span> | ||
===Registration Protocol=== | ===Registration Protocol=== | ||
The objective of the registration protocol is for a user, i.e. Alice, to authorise a new device and transfer to it the master key (sync key) thus allowing it to read and write encrypted data to and from the storage. To maintain the security of the master key the protocol must defend against a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack from an adversary. Importantly for version 2 of the eXfio Peer protocol the starting assumption is that an adversary has full access to the storage '''and''' knows the password, i.e. a hostile systems administrator. | The objective of the registration protocol is for a user, i.e. Alice, to authorise a new device and transfer to it the master key (sync key) thus allowing it to read and write encrypted data to and from the storage. To maintain the security of the master key the protocol must defend against a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack from an adversary. Importantly for version 2 of the eXfio Peer protocol the starting assumption is that an adversary has full access to the storage '''and''' knows the password, i.e. a hostile systems administrator. | ||