Talk:Extension Manager:Addon Update Security: Difference between revisions

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****''It'' [update.rdf] ''will be retrieved if the add-on has provided a public key for the purposes of verifying the digital signature in the update manifest.'' Doesn't this create a chicken-and-egg problem? I'm assuming by "update manifest" you mean update.rdf. If so, how will FF know if a public key has been provided in the update manifest if it can't retrieve it?
****''It'' [update.rdf] ''will be retrieved if the add-on has provided a public key for the purposes of verifying the digital signature in the update manifest.'' Doesn't this create a chicken-and-egg problem? I'm assuming by "update manifest" you mean update.rdf. If so, how will FF know if a public key has been provided in the update manifest if it can't retrieve it?
***** The public key is available in the already installed add-on. I believed that [[User:Mossop:Fx-Docs:AddonUpdateSecurity#Securing_Update_Manifests_Through_Digital_Signatures]] was reasonably clear on that. Possibly you could suggest a rewording that makes it clearer?


2. Suppose install.rdf contains an em:updateURL of https://foo.com/update.rdf. When FF retrieves the resource at https://foo.com/update.rdf, FF will install the update even if no em:updateHash element exists (assuming there are no problems with the certificate for foo.com). If, however, em:updateHash does exist, it is checked for validity against the update.
2. Suppose install.rdf contains an em:updateURL of https://foo.com/update.rdf. When FF retrieves the resource at https://foo.com/update.rdf, FF will install the update even if no em:updateHash element exists (assuming there are no problems with the certificate for foo.com). If, however, em:updateHash does exist, it is checked for validity against the update.
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