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→DNSSEC Chains
Each zone entered must be directly inner to the previous zone. The root zone may be omitted, because it is assumed that the client already has the DNSSEC keys for the root. The final entry is a TLSA (and corresponding RRSIG) record, again in wire format.
It is possible to optimize away some fields of these records, but at the moment this is not being done. Another optimization would be for the client to indicate a root of trust deeper down the tree so that the server can omit some zones. For example, a client may already have (and have validated) all of the keys for .com. In this case, example.com need only send a DS record entering example.com and the keys for example.com (as well as the final TLSA record).
For reference, another proposal for the serialization of a DNSSEC chain is [http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-dane-serializechain-00 here]. Note that this proposal does not follow exactly the wire format of DNS records. Consequently, preexisting code cannot be used to serialize, parse, or validate the chain. Additionally, more flexibility means more opportunities for insecure verifier behavior. This proposal is not currently being used in this project.
