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→DNSSEC Chains
It is possible to optimize away some fields of these records, but at the moment this is not being done. Another optimization would be for the client to indicate a root of trust deeper down the tree so that the server can omit some zones. For example, a client may already have (and have validated) all of the keys for .com. In the above example, if the client has already validated keys for .com, the server need only send the DS record entering bar.com and the keys for bar.com (as well as the final TLSA record).
Note that once a chain has been serialized, it will only be valid for as long as every signature in it is valid. That is, it will become invalid when any signature it contains expires.
For reference, another proposal for the serialization of a DNSSEC chain is [http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-dane-serializechain-00 here]. Note that this proposal does not follow exactly the wire format of DNS records. Consequently, preexisting code cannot be used to serialize, parse, or validate the chain. Additionally, more flexibility means more opportunities for insecure verifier behavior. This proposal is not currently being used in this project.
