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Services/KeyExchange: Difference between revisions
→Meeting Notes
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# Concerns | # Concerns | ||
## Confidence in J-PAKE: paper submitted to journal for official publication only recently, no peer review yet. | ## Confidence in J-PAKE: paper submitted to journal for official publication only recently, no peer review yet. | ||
## | ## Short PIN as proposed by UX makes channel hijacking, guessing easier | ||
## Firefox 4 timeframe short for implementation + crypto review | |||
## DoS | |||
## Changes to marketing messages necessary, are we willing to qualify our statements about Sync security + privacy | |||
# Proposals to prevent simple attacks | # Proposals to prevent simple attacks | ||
## Connections to the PAKE server should be over SSL, eliminates man-in-the-middle attacks. | ## Connections to the PAKE server should be over SSL, eliminates man-in-the-middle attacks. | ||
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## Only allow client that requests channel + the next client that connects to it to use the channel (limits eavesdropping/manipulation attacks) | ## Only allow client that requests channel + the next client that connects to it to use the channel (limits eavesdropping/manipulation attacks) | ||
## Only allow a limited number of attempts to use transfer via J-PAKE, fall back to traditional account setup. | ## Only allow a limited number of attempts to use transfer via J-PAKE, fall back to traditional account setup. | ||
## Client flags channel deletes that happen because of an abort. | |||
# Potential attacks (after above measures) | # Potential attacks (after above measures) | ||
## Compromised server does an online attack | ## Compromised server does an online attack | ||