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B2G App Security Model/Threat Model: Difference between revisions
B2G App Security Model/Threat Model (view source)
Revision as of 00:43, 23 March 2012
, 23 March 2012→Malicious Web App
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* The user might be tricked into installing an application | * The user might be tricked into installing an application | ||
====Potential Countermeasures==== | ====Potential Countermeasures==== | ||
* Process for removing permissions from known bad Web Apps(maybe even blocking them, or adding them to phishing and malware protection list) | * Process for removing permissions from known bad Web Apps (maybe even blocking them, or adding them to phishing and malware protection list) | ||
* Trusted stores pre-installed on the B2G device, and contracts with third-party developers | * Trusted stores pre-installed on the B2G device, and contracts with third-party developers | ||
* Appropriate warnings and acknowledgements when adding new trusted stores | * Appropriate warnings and acknowledgements when adding new trusted stores | ||
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* Requirement for HSTS for Apps granted permissions (Strict SSL even?) | * Requirement for HSTS for Apps granted permissions (Strict SSL even?) | ||
* User can audit permission usage of an app so s/he can uninstall the app if it seems to be doing something undesirable | * User can audit permission usage of an app so s/he can uninstall the app if it seems to be doing something undesirable | ||
* Debian-like app distribution (based on people-based GPG security) has methodology for this scenario: [[Apps/Security#dealing_with_rogue_applications]] | |||
(''Note: the use of SSL, whilst appearing to help solve the issue of malicious web apps, inadvertently introduces significant problems that far outweigh the perceived benefits. a full breakdown of the problems is listed at [[Apps/Security#The_Problem_With_Using_SSL]] '') | |||
=== UI Spoofing === | === UI Spoofing === | ||