CA:ImprovingRevocation: Difference between revisions

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* Process Change: To be determined.
* Process Change: To be determined.
=== OCSP Must-Staple ===
Websites that implement Must-Staple will get Hard Fail Revocation.
[http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10323.html IETF is working on a standardized must-staple mechanism], but it will be a long time before all CAs in our program have deployed that extension in all of the certificates they issue.
As an interim measure, we plan to implement a must-staple mechanism that any website can deploy that does not require the cooperation of any CA. The mechanism will be based on a Must-Staple HTTP header, analogous to the Strict-Transport-Security and the Public-Key-Pins mechanism being worked on in the IETF. For example, “Must-Staple: max-age=10886400; includeSubdomains” in a response to an HTTPS request on a connection with a valid certificate and a stapled OCSP response would cause the browser to reject any TLS handshake for that domain (and all subdomains) that does not include a stapled OCSP response.
This mechanism would suffer from the same first-visit problem that Strict-Transport-Security and Public-Key-Pins suffer from, but we can mitigate all these issues through the preloaded list mechanism that we're already using for HSTS.
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10351.html
* Discussion: ''Link to Discussion Thread''
* Code Change: ''Bugzilla Bug Number''
* Dependencies: OCSP Stapling
* Policy Change: To be determined.
* Process Change: To be determined.


=== ''Change Name'' ===
=== ''Change Name'' ===
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