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Security/Features/PasswordManagerImprovements: Difference between revisions
Security/Features/PasswordManagerImprovements (view source)
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** On mouseover of the fill in submit button, the user can read a tooltip that warns them that their password can be seen in the clear. | ** On mouseover of the fill in submit button, the user can read a tooltip that warns them that their password can be seen in the clear. | ||
** See also [https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features/HighlightCleartextPasswords Highlight Cleartext Passwords]. | ** See also [https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features/HighlightCleartextPasswords Highlight Cleartext Passwords]. | ||
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118540 Bug 1118540] Secure Filling 1.0 | * [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118540 Bug 1118540] Secure Filling 1.0 - Passwords that are saved by the password manager should not be available to javascript on the page. The actual password values should only be sent on submit. This protects the password from attacks via xss, 3rd party javascript, etc. Implementation details: when a password is filled in on a form, fill hash(uri, username, salt) instead of the actual password. On submit, lookup the actual password value for that url and send that instead. Username is included for cases where there are multiple usernames. | ||
2) Preventing local attacks: | 2) Preventing local attacks: | ||
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118549 Bug 1118549] Encryption - Explore solutions for encrypting the passwords stored locally in the password manager (for example, make use of keychain or encryption mechanisms that come with the OS). | * [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118549 Bug 1118549] Encryption - Explore solutions for encrypting the passwords stored locally in the password manager (for example, make use of keychain or encryption mechanisms that come with the OS). | ||
3) [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118553 Bug 1118553] Duplicate Passwords - Protecting users from password reuse attacks | 3) [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118553 Bug 1118553] Duplicate Passwords - Protecting users from password reuse attacks | ||
* Create UI around alerting users that they are reusing the same passwords | * Create UI around alerting users that they are reusing the same passwords | ||
4) HSTS | 4) HSTS: If a site is HSTS, then there is no reason to have http data for that site. Hence, if a site is marked HSTS, and the user has any data (cookies, passwords, etc) that are not https-only/secure, immediately mark that data as https-only. (Note that we'd need some way to indicate that the site has been STS for at least X weeks to prevent deleting data from a site that goes HSTS as a beta test and then goes back to non-HSTS.) | ||
<b>Autofill:</b> | <b>Autofill:</b> | ||
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* If an identical password is stored for both the http version and https version of a specific website (or domain), and it is not used on the http site for X months, expire the http version after alerting the user. (This can help in cases where the website has upgraded to https, but the user's http password manager entry still exists and is open to attack). | * If an identical password is stored for both the http version and https version of a specific website (or domain), and it is not used on the http site for X months, expire the http version after alerting the user. (This can help in cases where the website has upgraded to https, but the user's http password manager entry still exists and is open to attack). | ||
* | * When the password field name is different from the name when the password was saved, don't allow filling & submit. Moreover, don't allow javascript to dynamically change the name of the form?? See [https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-silver.pdf section 5.2, Preventing self exfiltration attacks]. | ||
* | * Consider not autofilling in cases where the page has multiple login forms. | ||
<b>Future Work:</b> | <b>Future Work:</b> | ||
* Support [https://mikewest.github.io/credentialmanagement/spec/ Credential Management Specification] so websites can opt into better detection and protection | * Support [https://mikewest.github.io/credentialmanagement/spec/ Credential Management Specification] so websites can opt into better detection and protection. | ||
* Prefer secure origins - If a password is stored in an http version of a site, see if the https version exists. If it does, prompt the user to redirect to the https version of the site and store their password there instead. (Issue here is that we don't always know if changing the url to https will work, or if a site is set up to have a different domain or path for their secure version) | * Prefer secure origins - If a password is stored in an http version of a site, see if the https version exists. If it does, prompt the user to redirect to the https version of the site and store their password there instead. (Issue here is that we don't always know if changing the url to https will work, or if a site is set up to have a different domain or path for their secure version) | ||
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118540 Bug 1118540] Secure Filling 2.0 | * [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118540 Bug 1118540] Secure Filling 2.0 | ||
** Do not give javascript access to any password fields (regardless of whether the password manager saves the password) - the actual password the user enters is only used on submit. The problem with this is with registration pages that use javascript to test the password strength. [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=653132 Bug 653132]. Can we detect registration pages? If a page a registration page has only one password field (they don't ask you to confirm your password by entering it twice) do they really use javascript to test password strength? Since they aren't asking you to confirm your password, they probably aren't too concerned with special characters. | ** Do not give javascript access to any password fields (regardless of whether the password manager saves the password) - the actual password the user enters is only used on submit. The problem with this is with registration pages that use javascript to test the password strength. [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=653132 Bug 653132]. Can we detect registration pages? If a page a registration page has only one password field (they don't ask you to confirm your password by entering it twice) do they really use javascript to test password strength? Since they aren't asking you to confirm your password, they probably aren't too concerned with special characters. | ||
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<b>Investigate more:</b> | <b>Investigate more:</b> | ||
* Only autofill forms after user interaction with the login page, not necessarily the form - https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=257156. We need more details here. | * Only autofill forms after user interaction with the login page, not necessarily the form - https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=257156. We need more details here. | ||
|Feature ux design=* What should the UX be when we do not autofill? | |Feature ux design=* What should the UX be when we do not autofill? | ||
*# Today the experience is that the user first has to type the username, and then the password will be filled in. [NB: it fails utterly on "password-only" forms (where the username is known to the site already, such as by a cookie) because there's no username field interaction to trigger the fill-in] | *# Today the experience is that the user first has to type the username, and then the password will be filled in. [NB: it fails utterly on "password-only" forms (where the username is known to the site already, such as by a cookie) because there's no username field interaction to trigger the fill-in] | ||