Security/Features/PasswordManagerImprovements: Difference between revisions

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Security/Features/PasswordManagerImprovements (view source)

Revision as of 01:06, 7 January 2015

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* Includes improvements to the Password Manager to prevent attacks such as "Lupin" in the paper [http://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1416 "Automated Password Extraction Attack on Modern Password Managers"].  When a user is on an insecure network and makes any http request, a mitm could add login iframes to the http request.  The mitm can then add javascript to the responses from the login pages that send the attacker the autocompleted passwords from password manager.
* Includes improvements to the Password Manager to prevent attacks such as "Lupin" in the paper [http://arxiv.org/abs/1309.1416 "Automated Password Extraction Attack on Modern Password Managers"].  When a user is on an insecure network and makes any http request, a mitm could add login iframes to the http request.  The mitm can then add javascript to the responses from the login pages that send the attacker the autocompleted passwords from password manager.
|Feature requirements=1) Preventing active network attacks:
|Feature requirements=1) Preventing active network attacks:
* Do not autofill the username/password stored in password manager on any pages. Provide alternative UX - <b>UX help needed</b>.  If automatically filling the password must be an option, then at least do not fill in the following cases.  (Note this does not secure the user from xss attacks, third party javascript, etc.)
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118511 Bug 1118511] Do not autofill the username/password stored in password manager on any pages. Provide alternative UX - <b>UX help needed</b>.  If automatically filling the password must be an option, then at least do not fill in the following cases.  (Note this does not secure the user from xss attacks, third party javascript, etc.)
** For http sites (IE 11 has this security feature)
** For http sites (IE 11 has this security feature)
** https sites that have mixed active content
** https sites that have mixed active content
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** in iframed sites (where the parent and frame are not  same orign, or always?) (safari does this for non-same origin, chrome does this for all frames). (Open Issue - what about third party widgets that allow users to login and post comments.)
** in iframed sites (where the parent and frame are not  same orign, or always?) (safari does this for non-same origin, chrome does this for all frames). (Open Issue - what about third party widgets that allow users to login and post comments.)
** Invisible form fields (visibility and opacity, although this isn't going to prevent clickjacking attacks to autofill the passwords)
** Invisible form fields (visibility and opacity, although this isn't going to prevent clickjacking attacks to autofill the passwords)
* Warn users when they are entering their passwords on HTTP sites. UX help needed for this. Some options:
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=748193 Bug 748193] Warn users when they are entering their passwords on HTTP sites. UX help needed for this. Some options:
** warning icon in the password field
** warning icon in the password field
** Fill-and-submit button is a different color
** Fill-and-submit button is a different color
** On mouseover of the fill in submit button, the user can read a tooltip that warns them that their password can be seen in the clear.
** On mouseover of the fill in submit button, the user can read a tooltip that warns them that their password can be seen in the clear.
** See also [https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features/HighlightCleartextPasswords Highlight Cleartext Passwords] and [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=759860 Bug 759860].
** See also [https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features/HighlightCleartextPasswords Highlight Cleartext Passwords].
* Secure Filling (platform work only) - Passwords that are saved by the password manager should not be available to javascript on the page.  The actual password values should only be sent on submit.  This protects the password from attacks via xss, 3rd party javascript, etc.  Implementation details: when a password is filled in on a form, fill hash(uri, username, salt) instead of the actual password.  On submit, lookup the actual password value for that url and send that instead.  Username is included for cases where there are multiple usernames.
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118540 Bug 1118540] Secure Filling 1.0 (platform work only) - Passwords that are saved by the password manager should not be available to javascript on the page.  The actual password values should only be sent on submit.  This protects the password from attacks via xss, 3rd party javascript, etc.  Implementation details: when a password is filled in on a form, fill hash(uri, username, salt) instead of the actual password.  On submit, lookup the actual password value for that url and send that instead.  Username is included for cases where there are multiple usernames.
2) Preventing local attacks:
2) Preventing local attacks:
* Explore solutions for encrypting the passwords stored locally in the password manager (for example, make use of keychain or encryption mechanisms that come with the OS).
* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118549 Bug 1118549] Encryption - Explore solutions for encrypting the passwords stored locally in the password manager (for example, make use of keychain or encryption mechanisms that come with the OS).
3) Duplicate Passwords - Protecting users from password reuse attacks
3) [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118553 Bug 1118553] Duplicate Passwords - Protecting users from password reuse attacks
* Create UI around alerting users that they are reusing the same passwords
* Create UI around alerting users that they are reusing the same passwords
4) HSTS (platform work only): If a site is HSTS, then there is no reason to have http data for that site. Hence, if a site is marked HSTS, and the user has any data (cookies, passwords, etc) that are not https-only/secure, immediately mark that data as https-only. (Note that we'd need some way to indicate that the site has been STS for at least X weeks to prevent deleting data from a site that goes HSTS as a beta test and then goes back to non-HSTS.)
4) HSTS (platform work only): If a site is HSTS, then there is no reason to have http data for that site. Hence, if a site is marked HSTS, and the user has any data (cookies, passwords, etc) that are not https-only/secure, immediately mark that data as https-only. (Note that we'd need some way to indicate that the site has been STS for at least X weeks to prevent deleting data from a site that goes HSTS as a beta test and then goes back to non-HSTS.)
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* Prefer secure origins - If a password is stored in an http version of a site, see if the https version exists.  If it does, prompt the user to redirect to the https version of the site and store their password there instead. (Issue here is that we don't always know if changing the url to https will work, or if a site is set up to have a different domain or path for their secure version)
* Prefer secure origins - If a password is stored in an http version of a site, see if the https version exists.  If it does, prompt the user to redirect to the https version of the site and store their password there instead. (Issue here is that we don't always know if changing the url to https will work, or if a site is set up to have a different domain or path for their secure version)


* [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1118540 Bug 1118540] Secure Filling 2.0 (platform work only)
** Do not give javascript access to any password fields (regardless of whether the password manager saves the password) - the actual password the user enters is only used on submit.  The problem with this is with registration pages that use javascript to test the password strength.  [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=653132 Bug 653132].  Can we detect registration pages?  If a page a registration page has only one password field (they don't ask you to confirm your password by entering it twice) do they really use javascript to test password strength?  Since they aren't asking you to confirm your password, they probably aren't too concerned with special characters.




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* Only autofill forms after user interaction with the login page, not necessarily the form - https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=257156.  We need more details here.
* Only autofill forms after user interaction with the login page, not necessarily the form - https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=257156.  We need more details here.


* Do not autofill (or even fill-and-submit for HTTP pages?) if the form action has changed since the password was stored (perhaps with a user override option). (To do this, we need to include the form action in the key, along with the url.  We'd need to check the action both on load and on submit.  What if it's a javascript action?  More investigation needed here.  We already do some flavor of this.)
* Assume we have implemented secure filling (javascript on the page can't read the password).  If the user prompts the password manager to fill in a password on an HTTP page and the form action has changed since the password was stored, don't send the password (might be tricky to implement).  Perhaps with an UI for user override. (Secure autofilling causes issues with ajax logins, a technique used mostly in china per https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/silver)


* Secure Filling 2.0 (platform work only)
** Do not give javascript access to any password fields (regardless of whether the password manager saves the password) - the actual password the user enters is only used on submit.  The problem with this is with registration pages that use javascript to test the password strength.  [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=653132 Bug 653132].  Can we detect registration pages?  If a page a registration page has only one password field (they don't ask you to confirm your password by entering it twice) do they really use javascript to test password strength?  Since they aren't asking you to confirm your password, they probably aren't too concerned with special characters.
|Feature ux design=* What should the UX be when we do not autofill?
|Feature ux design=* What should the UX be when we do not autofill?
*# Today the experience is that the user first has to type the username, and then the password will be filled in. [NB: it fails utterly on "password-only" forms (where the username is known to the site already, such as by a cookie) because there's no username field interaction to trigger the fill-in]
*# Today the experience is that the user first has to type the username, and then the password will be filled in. [NB: it fails utterly on "password-only" forms (where the username is known to the site already, such as by a cookie) because there's no username field interaction to trigger the fill-in]
Tanvi
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