CA/Auditor Mistakes

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Auditor Mistakes

During evaluation of a CA's root inclusion or change request, Mozilla uses public audit statements to help confirm that the CA is in compliance with the stated verification requirements, the BRs, and Mozilla's policy. Therefore, when members of Mozilla's community find a problem with certificates in the CA's hierarchy that should have been noted in the audit statement (as an exception or point of non-compliance), the CA may need to be re-audited to confirm that the problem has been resolved.

When egregious mistakes were overlooked by the auditor, or there are a significant number of oversights, or the auditor did not notice BR compliance problems with the root or intermediate certificates, then the CA must resolve the issues and be re-audited. For the re-audit the CA can either get re-audited by a different auditor, or have the current auditor provide an immediate plan for correction and compliance, and then present a mid-term partial audit following that plan. In either case, the auditor must provide documentation about steps they are taking to avoid making the same mistakes in future audits. If the auditor fails to assure Mozilla that they have corrected the deficiencies in their auditing process, then their standing as a trusted auditor for the Mozilla root program may be jeopardized.

Non-compliance to the following policies are examples of mistakes that auditors must not overlook.

  • BR Appendix A (section 6.1.5 in BR version 1.3) for root and intermediate certs - Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Requirements (Normative) - Certificates MUST meet the following requirements for algorithm type and key size.
  • BR Appendix B (section 7.1.2 in BR version 1.3) for root and intermediate certs – Certificate Extensions (Normative) - specifies the requirements for Certificate extensions for Certificates generated after the Effective Date.
  • With regards to root and intermediate certificates, defects prohibited by section 5.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy, including:
    • ASN.1 DER encoding errors;
    • invalid public keys (e.g., RSA certificates with public exponent equal to 1);
    • missing or incorrect extensions; or
    • cRLDistributionPoints or OCSP authorityInfoAccess extensions for which no operational CRL or OCSP service exists.

There are other types of mistakes that could potentially not be found by an auditor doing sampling of end-entity certificates. If the auditor did not note this type of mistake in the audit statement, then the CA must fix the mistake(s) and be re-audited to confirm that the problem has been resolved. The CA may use the same auditor that issued the previous audit statement.

Non-compliance to the following policies are examples of mistakes that auditors might overlook due to sampling of end-entity certificates:

  • BR 9.2.1 (section 7.1.4.2.1 in BR version 1.3) - Subject Alternative Name Extension - SSL certs must contain at least one entry
  • BR 9.2.2 (section 7.1.4.2.2 in BR version 1.3) - Subject Common Name Field - If present, this field MUST contain a single IP address or Fully-Qualified Domain Name that is one of the values contained in the Certificate’s subjectAltName extension
  • BR 9.4.1 (section 6.3.2 in BR version 1.3)- Subscriber Certificates - Subscriber Certificates issued after the Effective Date (1 July 2012) MUST have a Validity Period no greater than 60 months. (exceptions allowed)
  • BR Appendix A (section 6.1.5 in BR version 1.3) for Subscriber certs - Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Requirements (Normative) - Certificates MUST meet the following requirements for algorithm type and key size.
  • BR Appendix B (section 7.1.2 in BR version 1.3) for Subscriber certs – Certificate Extensions (Normative) - This appendix specifies the requirements for Certificate extensions for Certificates generated after the Effective Date.
  • Certificate defects prohibited by section 5.2 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy, including:
    • ASN.1 DER encoding errors;
    • invalid public keys (e.g., RSA certificates with public exponent equal to 1);
    • missing or incorrect extensions (e.g., TLS certificates with no subjectAltName extension or delegated OCSP responder certificates without the id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension);
    • duplicate issuer names and serial numbers, except that a Certificate Transparency precertificate may match its corresponding final certificate; or
    • cRLDistributionPoints or OCSP authorityInfoAccess extensions for which no operational CRL or OCSP service exists.

Finally, some compliance issues identified during evaluation of a root inclusion or change request may be resolved through corrective action and supporting evidence without requiring a new audit. Whether additional audit work is necessary depends on the nature, scope, and cause of the issue and the adequacy of the evidence provided. The CA must correct the issue and provide evidence demonstrating that the corrective action is effective. Examples alone may be insufficient where the issue raises concerns about the CA's controls or the reliability of its audit.

Issues that may be evaluated in this manner include:

  • CRL publication or update-frequency issues under section 4.9.7 of the TLS Baseline Requirements.
  • OCSP availability, response-validity, or HTTP GET support issues under section 4.9.9 of the TLS Baseline Requirements.
  • OCSP response-conformity issues under section 4.9.9 of the TLS Baseline Requirements, which references RFC 6960 and/or RFC 5019.

These examples do not establish an exemption from additional audit work. Resolution during the inclusion or change review also does not waive applicable incident-reporting or certificate-revocation requirements.