Firefox 3.6/PushState Security Review: Difference between revisions

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<li>We also have to try and prevent a site from DOSing the browser by pushing many large objects.</li>
<li>We also have to try and prevent a site from DOSing the browser by pushing many large objects.</li>
<li>I'm not sure whether the spec's same-origin check is sufficient for file:// URIs.</li>
<li>I'm not sure whether the spec's same-origin check is sufficient for file:// URIs.</li>
<li>If we save pushStated data to disk (say for crash restore purposes), then we're allowing webpages to write arbitrarily large data do disk.  We should probably put a limit on this.  Additionally, if we allow serialization of binary-like objects (images?), we may be allowing pages to write truly arbitrary, potentially executable data to disk.</li>
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