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<strong>Unfortunately, when a server is using the vulnerable SSL/TLS protocol version, it is impossible for the browser to know whether a site is protected or vulnerable (i.e whether session renegotiation is enabled or disabled on the server).</strong> | <strong>Unfortunately, when a server is using the vulnerable SSL/TLS protocol version, it is impossible for the browser to know whether a site is protected or vulnerable (i.e whether session renegotiation is enabled or disabled on the server).</strong> | ||
Because of this | Because of this uncertainty, when using the existing SSL/TLS protocol versions, Firefox does not know whether a server is vulnerable. Firefox, therefore, is unable to determine whether a connection has been attacked. | ||
An [http://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc5746.txt enhanced SSL/TLS protocol version] <strong>has been finalized</strong> and is now published as RFC 5746. | An [http://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc5746.txt enhanced SSL/TLS protocol version] <strong>has been finalized</strong> and is now published as RFC 5746. | ||
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Hopefully all of them have really disabled the <cite>session renegotiation</cite> feature on their servers. Unfortunately, it's impossible for anyone else to verify. | Hopefully all of them have really disabled the <cite>session renegotiation</cite> feature on their servers. Unfortunately, it's impossible for anyone else to verify. | ||
Imagine an administrator at a major E-Commerce site, still running old software versions, installed some older version of a configuration file and at the same time accidentally re-enabled the <cite>session renegotiation</cite>. There wouldn't be any | Imagine an administrator at a major E-Commerce site, still running old software versions, installed some older version of a configuration file and at the same time accidentally re-enabled the <cite>session renegotiation</cite>. There wouldn't be any noticeable consequences. They site would still work as before, but suddenly the server and user's information become vulnerable again. | ||
Because of this | Because of this uncertainty and risk associated with running old SSL/TLS software, it is strongly recommended that all servers and clients are upgraded to software that supports RFC 5746 as soon as possible. | ||
While most modern browser software has been upgraded to support RFC 5746, and upgrading the browsers is a mandatory action, <strong>upgrading the browsers is not sufficient</strong>! A verified protection against the attack requires both browsers and servers to upgrade. | While most modern browser software has been upgraded to support RFC 5746, and upgrading the browsers is a mandatory action, <strong>upgrading the browsers is not sufficient</strong>! A verified protection against the attack requires both browsers and servers to upgrade. | ||
As soon as a critical mass of servers has been upgraded to support RFC 5746, the browsers can start to assist users in discovering questionable servers and potentially vulnerable servers more easily. | |||
==Action== | ==Action== | ||