Security/Reviews/AppsOnSDcard

Storing apps data on the sdcard

Storage on the /data partition is limited. It is proposed to store some or all app data on the sdcard instead of the local device storage. This introduces a number of security threats:

• Sensitive app data might be disclosed
• Apps will not be available if sdcard is not present
• App data may be modified (both app code & data)

Threat Model

Moving apps to the sdcard has an effect on a number of threat scenarios.

• Lost device: sdcard is more accessible, potentially exposing app data
• Short-term physical access to device ('evil-maid' scenario): removing and copying an sdcard is a more likely scenario than copy data off internal memory
• Malicious docking station (e.g. malicious charging station): usb mass storage controller may provide access to sdcard
• Remote exploit through malicious apps/content: APIs (e.g. DeviceStorage) provide limited access to the sdcard

Threats

Threat	Proposed controls
sdcard could be removed and accessed in another machine	Encrypt all data with device-specific key
sdcard can be accessed via USB mass storage	modify USB mass storage so that it only provides access to part of the sdcard
sdcard can be accessed via Device Storage API	modify Device Storage API so that it doesn't provide access to app data directories
weaker file permissions on sdcard may may exploitation of gecko vulnerabilities easier	Set permissions with the same restrictions as /data