Electrolysis/Meetings/2009-09-21-validation document navigation

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#content IRC meeting about Chrome validation of content navigation

Held on 2009/09/21 between bz, bsmedberg

(14:47:45) bsmedberg: Well, basically this is about: pages first
(14:47:45) bsmedberg: and eventually process-per-domain
(14:47:51) bsmedberg: so the chrome process wants the ability to see toplevel navigation and perhaps cancel/redirect it somewhere else
(14:48:13) bz: right
(14:48:21) ***bz thinks
(14:48:31) bz: so from my pov, the ideal is that all navigation is async, as I said
(14:48:46) bz: in the sense that content does something that should trigger a navigation
(14:48:55) bz: we send a message to the chrome process to do that navigation
(14:48:58) bz: then it does the navigation
(14:48:59) bz: or something
(14:49:07) bsmedberg: perhaps...
(14:49:11) ***bz is not sure he's necessarily making sense.  ;)
(14:49:19) bsmedberg: the navigation data could be quite large, if you have form submission
(14:49:24) bz: well
(14:49:32) bz: we have to send that data to the chrome process anyway
(14:49:33) bz: no?
(14:49:38) bsmedberg: yeah, maybe
(14:49:41) bz: just so it can put it on the wire....
(14:49:50) bsmedberg: I was figuring it would be in the form of a network request, but there are perhaps other ways to do ti!
(14:50:16) bsmedberg: this is partly bug 514705, currently in robin_bb's queue
(14:50:19) firebot: bsmedberg: Bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=514705 nor, --, ---, moz@shorestreet.com, ASSI, The tab browser should inform the chrome process during navigation
(14:50:26) bz: so here's the thing
(14:50:28) bz: long term
(14:50:39) bz: we want to move CheckLoadURI checks into the chrome process
(14:50:49) bz: and not trust any self-reported principals of content processes
(14:50:54) bz: right?
(14:50:58) bsmedberg: hrm, I'm not sure that's ever going to be feasiable
(14:51:30) bsmedberg: it's certainly not part of releasing anything, or even releasing anything with a sandbox
(14:51:59) bz: it seems like it lets you trivially escape the sandbox....
(14:52:07) bz: if not done
(14:52:15) bsmedberg: depends on what the sandbox is for, though
(14:52:28) bsmedberg: If it's only to prevent viral infections and such, I think you're fine
(14:53:03) bsmedberg: and protecting against XSS/cookiedata leaks is much harder due to interior iframes, document.cookie scripting, loading arbitrary JS/images
(14:55:16) ***bz is not sure why it's fine
(14:55:40) bz: as long as you can ask the chrome process to do network requests for you
(14:55:50) bz: and it trusts your self-reported principal
(14:55:55) bz: you can read arbitrary files
(14:56:00) bz: and phone home
(14:56:05) bz: not a viral infection
(14:56:10) bz: but much worse than just XSS
(15:01:36) bz: ok
(15:01:40) bz: so are we set enough for now?
(15:01:48) bz: It sounds like fred has things to do
(15:01:56) bz: anything in particular _I_ should do on this front?
(15:02:17) bz: Or should I focus on my plan, which is to work on getting the subprocess hookup in frameloader to be a little smoother?
(15:02:27) bz: (modulo all the interruptions from layout/perf stuff)
(15:02:50) bz: bsmedberg: and btw, if there are particular things that you think it's worth me focusing on more, please say
(15:03:06) bz: bsmedberg: I can put layout/perf stuff on hold as needed.  ;)