NSSCryptoModuleSpec/Section 9: Self Tests

List every error state & error indicator - Document all error states associated with each self-test, and indicate for each error state the expected error indicator.

Failure of any of the power-up, conditional, or operator-initiated self-tests causes the cryptographic module to enter the Error state (State 3 ). If the pairwise consistency test fails, the FC_GenerateKeyPair function returns the error code CKR_GENERAL_ERROR. If any other self-test fails, the PKCS #11 function returns the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR. When the cryptographic module is in the Error state, most PKCS #11 functions (including all the functions that perform cryptographic operations) do nothing and return the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR. See also the Show Status service of the cryptographic module.

Module in Error State: Ensure that cryptographic operations cannot be performed and all data output via the data output interface is inhibited while the module is in the error state. See VE02.06.01 for the vendor design requirement.

VE.09.05.01 VE.09.06.01

All the PKCS #11 functions that perform cryptographic operations or output data check the Boolean state variable sftk_fatalError on entry. In the Error state (sftk_fatalError is true), no action besides returning the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR is taken by those functions, which prevents cryptograhic operations and data output. (See also In Error State.)

List and describe the power-up & conditional self-tests performed by the module

VE.09.07.01 VE.09.13.01 VE.09.16.01 VE.09.18.01 VE.09.18.02 VE.09.19.01 VE.09.19.02 VE.09.20.01

• Power-up tests

• Conditional tests
  • Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys): the module performs the pair-wise consistency test specified in FIPS 140-2 Section 4.9.2 when it generates RSA, DSA, and ECDSA key pairs.
  • Continuous random number generator test: the module performs the continuous random number generator test specified in FIPS 140-2 Section 4.9.2 that tests for failure to a constant value.
  • In addtion to power up, NSS also performs health checks on the random number generate at instantiate and reseed time.
  • No other conditional tests are performed.

These tests are mandatory for the FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.

For each error condition, document the actions neccessary to clear the condition and resume normal operation.

The cryptographic module has only one Error state, which is entered when any self-test fails. The error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR returned by cryptographic functions indicates that the module is in the Error state. For the fatal error condition CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, the only way to clear the condition is to shut down and restart the module. Upon restart the power-up tests will be initiated automatically and do not require operator intervention.

Describe automatic initiation of power-up self-tests requires that the running of power-up self-tests not involve any inputs from or actions by the operator.

When the FC_Initialize function is called, which initializes the PKCS #11 library of the NSS cryptographic module for the FIPS Approved mode of operation, the power-up self-tests are initiated automatically and don't require operator intervention.

Results of power-up self-tests successful completion indicator for the power-up self-tests.

The FC_Initialize function returns the code CKR_OK upon successful completion of the power-up self-tests.

Procedure by which an operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand

The operator can initiate the power-up self-tests on demand by calling the FC_Finalize and FC_Initialize functions to shut down and restart the module.

specify the method used to compare the calculated output with the known answer.

VE.09.17.01

PORT_Memcmp, a synonym for memcmp, is used to compare the calculated output with the known answer byte by byte. sftk_fipsPowerUpSelfTest

Error State when two outputs are not equal.

VE.09.17.02

When the two outputs are not equal, the module enters the Error state (by setting the Boolean state variable sftk_fatalError to true) and returns the error code CKR_DEVICE_ERROR.

(N/A) The NSS cryptographic module doesn't include two independent implementations of the same cryptographic algorithm.

Integrity test for software components

VE.09.22.01 VE.09.22.02 VE.09.22.03

Software Integrity Test

VE.09.27.01

The critical security functions of the cryptographic module are:

• Random number generation. Used for the generation of cryptographic keys used by Approved cryptographic algorithms. Tested by the random number generator health tests on power up, instantiate and reseed time and the conditional continuous random number generator test.
• Operation of the cryptographic algorithms. Used for encryption, decryption, and authentication. Tested by the power-up cryptographic algorithm tests and the conditional pairwise consistency test (when the module generates public and private keys).

Key transport method

VE.09.31.01

RSA encryption (Key Wrapping using RSA keys) is the only key transport method that VE.09.31.01 applies to. The pairwise consistency check, as defined in AS09.31, is implemented in the sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck function. (See the source code under the comment "Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt.") If the sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck call fails, FC_GenerateKeyPair sets sftk_fatalError to true (to enter the Error state) and returns the error code CKR_GENERAL_ERROR.

Digital signatures

VE.09.33.01

The sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck function of the module tests the pairwise consistency of the public and private keys used for digital signatures by the calculation and verification of a signature. If the signature cannot be verified, the test fails. (See the source code under the comment "Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify.") If the sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck call fails, FC_GenerateKeyPair sets sftk_fatalError to true (to enter the Error state) and returns the error code CKR_GENERAL_ERROR.

Approved authentication technique used for the software/firmware load test

VE.09.35.01 VE.09.35.02

N/A. No software or firmware components can be externally loaded into the cryptographic module.

Manual Key Entry Test

VE.09.40.01 VE.09.40.02

Random number generator is implemented, document the continuous RNG test performed

VE.09.42.01 VE.09.43.01

There is only one random number generator (RNG) used in the NSS cryptographic module. The RNG is an Approved RNG, implementing Algorithm Hash_DRBG of NIST SP 800-90.

VE.09.45.01 VE.09.45.02 VE.09.46.01 VE.09.46.02