SecurityEngineering/Public Key Pinning/ReleaseEngineering
Whom to contact in case of emergency
- Mozilla: firstname.lastname@example.org or email@example.com (last resort)
- Google: firstname.lastname@example.org or agl or email@example.com (last resort)
- Dropbox: April King (firstname.lastname@example.org)
- Facebook: Scott Renfro (email@example.com)
Pinning is enabled by default in Nightly 32.
What critical Mozilla properties are we planning to pin?
- aus4 is under question. We have a meeting with rstrong to discuss what, if any, benefits pinning provides over verifying the signature on the actual binaries and requiring those come from a known issuer. The drawback of pinning the updater is that we may break ourselves.
How to rollback pinning for Firefox
Pinning is controlled by a preference, security.cert_pinning.enforcement_level. To disable pinning, set this pref to 0. In case of emergency, we can
- Push a hotfix to disable the pinning pref. In case pinning breaks AMO, this will not be possible.
- Push a chemspill. In case pinning breaks aus4, this will not be possible.
- bug 1012875 Wait 8 or 10 weeks until the pinset expires once it reaches stable, during which time users will not be able to reach sites that are pinned incorrectly.
How long do updates take?
- Hotfix: almost all users in 2 days
- Chemspill: unknown
- Fennec (Google play): Majority users in 2 days
What about other platforms besides desktop?
In bug 1012882, we decided to not pin on b2g right now, and (maybe) to wait for a couple of cycles to pin on Fennec.