Account confirmers, Anti-spam team, Confirmed users, Bureaucrats and Sysops emeriti
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(More Incident S, from Computest) |
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==Incident R: Purchase of StartCom (Nov 2015)== | ==Incident R: Purchase of StartCom (Nov 2015)== | ||
WoSign purchased the CA "StartCom" and did not disclose the transaction as a change of ownership, | WoSign purchased the CA "StartCom" and did not disclose the transaction as a change of ownership, which may violate section 5 of the [https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/maintenance/ Mozilla CA Certificate Maintenance Policy]. More details to be provided. | ||
==Incident S: Backdated SHA-1 Certs (January 2016)== | ==Incident S: Backdated SHA-1 Certs (January 2016)== | ||
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|Rob Stradling of Comodo writes: "These two cross-certificates are currently unexpired and unrevoked. However, the 'UTN-USERFirst-Object' root is only enabled for the Code Signing trust bit in NSS. There are 2 cross-certs (currently unconstrained and unrevoked) issued by 'AddTrust External CA Root' to 'UTN-USERFirst-Object'. However, the cross-certs issued to WoSign are EKU-constrained to Code Signing/Time Stamping." | |Rob Stradling of Comodo writes: "These two cross-certificates are currently unexpired and unrevoked. However, the 'UTN-USERFirst-Object' root is only enabled for the Code Signing trust bit in NSS. There are 2 cross-certs (currently unconstrained and unrevoked) issued by 'AddTrust External CA Root' to 'UTN-USERFirst-Object'. However, the cross-certs issued to WoSign are EKU-constrained to Code Signing/Time Stamping." | ||
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