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CA/Symantec Issues

73 bytes added, 11:01, 3 April 2017
Tweaks to Issue L
It is concerning that their first experience with SHA-1 misissuance did not cause them to analyse their systems and find this potential problem, or to put in place SHA-1 blocks in enough places to catch this.
==Issue L: Cross-Signing the US Federal Bridge (December 2015 February 2011 - July 2016)==
The US Government has an extremely complicated PKI called the Federal PKI. It has [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=478418 applied for inclusion] in the Mozilla root store but that application seemed unlikely ever to be successful due to the difficulty of bringing the entire FPKI in line with Mozilla's policies. At the time of this incident, it had a number of non-audited subordinate CAs.
Presumably in November Since February 2011, Symantec has regularly had a valid cross-sign for one or December both of 2015, Symantec "[https://crt.sh/?idcaid=12638543 cross-signed1324 Federal Bridge CA] one of the root CAs in the FPKI ("and "[https://crt.sh/?caid=1410 Federal Bridge CA 2013]"), which are both part of the FPKI, thereby making certificates below that root those roots in the chain of trust be publicly trusted, and technically making Symantec responsible to Mozilla for all certificates issued in the covered part of the FPKI, including any BR violations. The intermediate CA certificate (s) concerned was were not disclosed in the CCADB, as Mozilla practice at the time required. This was [https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/0wSUJKnH5MY/PGhVbV-UBQAJ reported in m.d.s.policy].
Symantec is not the only CA to have done this; IdenTrust [https://crt.sh/?id=9114292 also did iton multiple occasions]from 2011-01-14 onwards. Their cross-signI don's notBefore is in January 2015 t believe there are any unexpired unrevoked (by OneCRL) links between the FPKI and they revoked it on 17th February 2016the Mozilla trust store any more, two years before it was due to expirevia any CA.
===Symantec Response===
When this was drawn to their attention, Symantec [https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/0wSUJKnH5MY/OAJD-tWBAAAJ did not revoke] the cross-signcertificate under discussion, instead allowing it to expire (less than a month later).
==Issue N: Premature Manual Signing Using SHA-1 (July 2016)==
Symantec's RAs appear to have had a history of poor compliance with the BRs and other audit requirements, facts which were known to Symantec but not disclosed to Mozilla or dealt with in appropriately comprehensive ways.
Over multiple years ([https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/symantec-webtrust-audit-report.pdf 2013-12-01 to 2014-11-30], [https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/GeoTrust-WTBR-2015.pdf n 2014-12-01 to 2015-11-30]), Symantec's "GeoTrust" audits were qualified to say that they did not have proper audit information for some of these RAs. This information was in their management assertions, and repeated in the audit findings. So the poor audit situation was ongoing and known. Also, other audit reports, despite being in hierarchies accessible for issuance by the same RAs, did not have similar qualifications ([https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/repository/Symantec-STN-WTCA-2015.pdf Symantec Trust Network, 2014-12-01 to 2015-11-30]).
We currently know of four RAs who were in Symantec's program - CrossCert, Certisign, Certsuperior, and Certisur.
Accountapprovers, antispam, confirm, emeritus
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