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Security Policy: Difference between revisions
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→Mitigation of Other Attacks
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*RSA blinding: most recently Boneh and Brumley[1] showed that RSA blinding is an effective defense against timing attacks on RSA. | *RSA blinding: most recently Boneh and Brumley[1] showed that RSA blinding is an effective defense against timing attacks on RSA. | ||
*Cache invariant modular exponentiation: this is a variant of a modular exponentiation implementation that Colin Percival[2] showed to defend against cache-timing attacks. | *Cache invariant modular exponentiation: this is a variant of a modular exponentiation implementation that Colin Percival[2] showed to defend against cache-timing attacks. | ||
*Doublechecking RSA signatures: Arithmetical errors in RSA signatures might leak the private key. Ferguson and Schneier[3] recommend that every RSA signature generation should verify the signature just generated | *Doublechecking RSA signatures: Arithmetical errors in RSA signatures might leak the private key. Ferguson and Schneier[3] recommend that every RSA signature generation should verify the signature just generated. | ||
== Results of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Maintenance Validation of NSS 3.11.5 == | == Results of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Maintenance Validation of NSS 3.11.5 == | ||