Security/WebAPI/Web Telephony: Difference between revisions

Goals

* allow web content to dial out

*allow content to mediate incoming calls (accept/reject/merge) *allow content to query transceiver state

 

Bug:

*B2G Meta telephony bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=699235

*Web Telephony meta bug:  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=674726

Articles:

*http://hacks.mozilla.org/2012/03/webtelephony-api-and-websms-api-part-of-webapi/

*Detailed code walkthrough for receive call case: https://wiki.mozilla.org/B2G/Architecture#RIL:_Telephony

Changeset

*https://hg.mozilla.org/integration/mozilla-inbound/rev/bac673bc7211

Source:

*http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/telephony/

*https://github.com/mozilla-b2g/android-hardware-ril/blob/master/include/telephony/ril.h

 

{| border="1" class="fullwidth-table sortable"

|ID||Title||Threat||Proposed Mitigations||Threat Agent||Rating||Likelihood||Notes||Impact||Notes

|1||Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API||A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements ||\* App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs

\* B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)||Malicious web content||||Requires a bug in broader browser security model||||||\* Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls

\* Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy

\* probably would have broader implications

 

|2||Attack from radio network||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack.||\* Code review

\* Fuzzing

||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets||||||||||

|3||Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability ||A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash.||\* Code review

\* Fuzzing

\* Limiting access to API||Malicious web content||||||||||\*Dangerous since it involves privileged code

|3||Content spoofing phones dialer app||Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack||\*Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)

\* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||

|4||Content framing the dialer app||If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.||\* Broader B2G issue

\* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||