Security/WebAPI/Web Telephony: Difference between revisions

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| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes'''
| align="center" style="background:#f0f0f0;"|'''Notes'''
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| 1||Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API||A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements ||* App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs * B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)||Malicious web content||?||Requires a bug in broader browser security model||||||\"* Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls
| 1||Unauthorized content accesses the Web Telephony API||A web page or web app accesses the Telephony API with having the valid permissions or requirements ||* App Permissions Model will enforce which apps can access which APIs * B2G security model will enforce permissions model at a process level (ie less privileged process not allowed to send IPDL messages even if permissions check fails at an API level)||Malicious web content||?||Requires a bug in broader browser security model||||||
* Place unauthorized calls, cost the user money, make spam phone calls
* Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy
* Use phone a bugging device, breach user privacy
* probably would have broader implications
* probably would have broader implications
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| 2||Attack from radio network||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack.||* Code review * Fuzzing||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets||?||?||?||||
| 2||Attack from radio network||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets could attack the web telephony stack.||* Code review * Fuzzing||Malicious service provider or attacker with ability to inject radio packets||?||?||?||||
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| 3||Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability ||A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash.||* Code review* Fuzzing* Limiting access to API||Malicious web content||||||?||||*Dangerous since it involves privileged code
| 3||Bug in Web Telephony stack leads to code execution vulnerability ||A web page could supply malicious data to an API, triggering an exploitable crash.||* Code review* Fuzzing* Limiting access to API||Malicious web content||||||?||||
*Dangerous since it involves privileged code
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| 3||Content spoofing phones dialer app||Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack||*Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||?||||
| 3||Content spoofing phones dialer app||Webpage or app masquerades as the dialer for a complex phishing attack||
*Sort of a broader B2G issue (all apps could be spoofed)* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||?||||
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| 4||Content framing the dialer app||If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.||* Broader B2G issue* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||
| 4||Content framing the dialer app||If content could frame the dialer app, or load it in a manner where it was obscured, malicious content might be able to induce the user to make a call.||
* Broader B2G issue
* Only high-privileged content process will have access to send dialer IPDL messages||Malicious web content||||||||||
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