CA:MaintenanceAndEnforcement: Difference between revisions

* The Certificate Manager does not recognize the "distrust" flag, so there is no distinction in the user interface between Actively Distrusted certificates and all other certificates. Additionally, users can manually turn on the trust bits for Actively Distrusted certificates.  

** Possible Scenario: A user gets an error message that a website they browsed to is untrusted. They open the Certificate Manager and turn on the trust bits for an Actively Distrusted cert. This change is permanent until the user manually restores the default root settings or turns off the trust bits for that cert. So at some later date the user could accidentally browse to the corresponding malicious website and the site will appear to be trusted.

* Distrusting a certificate requires a release to the NSS root module and to Firefox, and users have to choose to upgrade to the new version.  

** Possible Scenario: An end user decides not to update their version of Firefox, so they continue to trust the certificate, somehow browse to the corresponding malicious website, and the website is shown as trusted.