Security/Sandbox
Sandboxing Firefox
This page tracks and explain how sandboxing is being worked on for Firefox (OS, Desktop, etc.) Sandboxes use the process as the security boundary. The process model, i.e. how we split Firefox into processes and how the processes interact between each other is common to all platforms. The implementation of the sandbox mechanism is independent, per platform. Firefox OS and Linux desktop Firefox use the same implementation.
Documentation
- How to I make my code work safely in the sandbox?
- How does the Linux and B2G (seccomp-bpf) sandbox work?
- B2G details
- [TODO] TLDR equivalent of the above for seccomp only
- How does the Windows sandbox work?
- [TODO] {{{1}}}
Roadmap (high-level)
This roadmap may evolve over time.
- Land sandbox implementation for all platforms with not-very-restrictive-whitelist
- [DONE] B2G
- [NEW] Windows
- [NEW] Linux
- [NEW] MacOS X (inactive)
- [NEW] Fennec (inactive)
- (Desktop) Help e10s Electrolysis
- FIXME
- Documentation efforts
- Sandbox implementations
- [ON TRACK] B2G
- [NEW] Windows
- {ok|Linux}}
- [NEW] MacOS X (inactive)
- [NEW] Fennec (inactive)
- Remoting
- [ON TRACK] Security/B2G/FirefoxOSCommsHardening
- Sandbox implementations
- Fix IPC issues
- Reduce whitelist by fixing/remoting APIs
- Achieve decent whitelist: No FS access, no process creation or no additional rights in child processes.
- Achieve good whitelist.
Status
- Tracking bug for desktop Firefox: bug 925570.
- Tracking bug for Firefox OS: bug 790923.
Firefox OS / B2G
Firefox OS 1.2
- [DONE] Land implementation bug 790923
Firefox OS 1.4
Dependencies (see bug 929277 for details):
14 Total; 0 Open (0%); 14 Resolved (100%); 0 Verified (0%);
NeedABug
- [NEW] enable build/test devices (tbpl) to test with sandboxing
Permissions burndown
See seccomp_filter.h for current list. Note: More syscalls could be removed as some of them, while not a direct security issue, may lead to access to a kernel bug, for example, see do_brk()'s CVE-2003-0961)
Decent whitelist
To remove for achieving a "decent whitelist".
fstat64(), stat64(), access() | Med | Information leak. Tells the process if a file/path exists, and its attributes (inode, etc. See man fstat64) |
getdents64() | Med | Information leak. Lists directories. |
open() | High | FS access: Open files. |
unlink() | High | FS access: Delete files. |
Good whitelist
To remove for achieving a "good whitelist".
ioctl() | High | Mainly used for GL/Graphics. To be removed or/and argument-filtered, see bug 920372 |
sigprocmask() | Med | Change signals. We don't want signals to be rerouted in general. |
prctl() | Med | Change process attributes, including security relevant bits. Note: when removed, this means no child process can tighten it's whitelist further either. |
getpriority(), setpriority() | Med | Access priority attributes from target processes. |
sched_setscheduler() | Med | Change scheduling policy/params of target processes. |
Linux Firefox
- [DONE] Land Library bug 742434
- [ON TRACK] Enable sandbox
Permissions burndown
Permission burn down list (see bug 942695 for details):
4 Total; 0 Open (0%); 4 Resolved (100%); 0 Verified (0%);
Windows Firefox
- [DONE] Land Library bug 922756
- [ON TRACK] Start using library to sandbox e10s processes unrestricted bug 925571
- [NEW] List and prioritize permissions to shut off
- [NEW] Burn down permission list
Permission List:
- [ON TRACK] Use a separate Windows Desktop within the same Windows Station - bug 928061
- [ON TRACK] Use a separate Windows Station + Desktop - bug 928055
- [ON TRACK] Set low integrity on content processes for Windows sandboxing policy - bug 928062
- more not yet posted
MacOS X Firefox
- [NEW] Land Library -- bug 387248
- [NEW] List and prioritize permissions to shut off
- [NEW] Burn down permission list
Permission List:
TBD |
Future work
These are some things that we need to attack next (after a basic sandbox).
- GPU remoting
- (Desktop) Accessibility support
- Process Model
- Parent process as enforcing + ACL check only?
- Resource limits
- (Desktop) DevTools support
Contact
Some folks from the SecurityEngineering team:
- briansmith, mmc, keeler, grobinson, ckerschb, sid, and bbondy.
Some folks from the Firefox OS Security team:
- pauljt and kang.
- Mailing list: boxing@lists.mozilla.org
- IRC: irc.mozilla.org #boxing and #security
Additional resources
Sandboxing
- Features/Security/Low_rights_Firefox -- bug 730956
- Ian's sandboxing page
- Servo
- Chromium Sandbox
- seccomp sandboxing on b2g
- Apple's Sandbox guide
- IPDL Tutorial
- DocShell
Not up to date/Archived
- One page overview
- FAQ
- Standing meeting notes
- Process Model
- Addon Strategy
- FoxInABox/ThingsThatShouldWork
Related projects
- Electrolysis
- Multiprocess Firefox summary by Bill Mc Closkey
- Embedding/IPCLiteAPI, https://github.com/tmeshkova/mozilla-central
- Native Client on Wikipedia - has links to papers on Native Client's design and use of SFI, as well as papers on SFI itself
- AMO/Squeaky, or Make Addons Awesome