Security/Reviews/Firefox8/InContentUIUnification

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Items to be reviewed: In-content UI Visual Unification - https://wiki.mozilla.org/Features/Firefox/In-content_UI_Visual_Unification

Introduce Feature

Goal of Feature, what is trying to be achieved (problem solved, use cases, etc)

  • in content pages that are chrome privileged
  • make things more consistent
  • updating about:crashes & error pages, security exception pages
    • just updating the look for consistency
  • for other pages this is a unification of the look, but not a lot that is new
  • also want things to be less able to be spoofed
    • i.e. navigation not shown in places like add-ons manager, about:config

What solutions/approaches were considered other than the proposed solution?

  • none, unification is necessary to avoid confusing users

Why was this solution chosen?

  • best way to give consistency to the product

Any security threats already considered in the design and why?

  • some thought given to the UI to prevent its use as a spoofable object

Threat Brainstorming

  • Given there is no address bar for app tabs how does this help with spoofing?
    • does this imply the breadcrumbs won't be shown for app tabs also ?
      • yes, it does. Whatever the content provides, would but up to the content provider
    • For in-content UI this will style to mesh with the page
    • main concern is if a dialog box can be opened that would allow a user to input sensitive info such as username/password
  • Could we leverage a theme or persona the user has chosen to help with this?
    • this is being looked at but not landed at this time
    • there is a platform problem that makes the text look bad that needs to be fixed first

Conclusions / Action Items

  • need to have a larger discussion on how to make master password or sign-in type items less spoofable
    • out of scope for this discussion
  • Change code so that address bar will not be removed when the about: page is marked "safe". Then, we can rely on the fact that the user navigated to the page by some Chrome action or keyboard shortcut.
    • We are assuming all pages will open in a new tab. We should document this decision somewhere (e.g. in the code)
    • We should document that we are not allowing open web apps to let personas bleed through due to security concerns.