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Security/Features/Intranet CSRF Blocker

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Status

Intranet CSRF Blocker
Stage On hold
Status In progress
Release target `
Health `
Status note `

Team

Product manager Sid Stamm
Directly Responsible Individual `
Lead engineer Steve Workman
Security lead `
Privacy lead `
Localization lead `
Accessibility lead `
QA lead `
UX lead `
Product marketing lead `
Operations lead `
Additional members Brian Smith

Open issues/risks

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Stage 1: Definition

1. Feature overview

Intranet CSRF Blocker enables Firefox to be aware of the source of network loads for sub-document resources, such as images, iframes, XHR, etc., and to use this extra context to decide if the network load should be permitted. The goal of this feature is to prevent web pages on the public Internet from causing a user's browser to send requests to resources residing on a private network.

2. Users & use cases

RFC 1918 defines the set of CIDR blocks which are not publicly addressable from the Internet and which are generally used to address hosts found on private home or enterprise networks. Included in this range are: 192.168.0.0/16, 172.16.0.0/12, and 10.0.0.0/8.

Starting around 2006, security researchers, notably Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen, began pointing out an architectural weakness in the Web that allowed (untrusted) websites on the public Internet to cause requests to be sent to hosts on these private networks, which would otherwise be protected by NAT. Malicious requests of this type can be used by an attacker for: port scanning internal networks, reconfiguring home routers, sending print jobs to network printers, and CSRF to applications that use network access as authentication.

For more background, see:

3. Dependencies

See related bug 354493. Dependencies:

ID Summary Status
584155 Add a scriptable SOCKS proxy server to allow testing of SOCKS client code NEW
585191 Enable SOCKS proxy server in mochitests NEW
255107 Prevent data: URLs from being used for XSS NEW

Open; Resolved; Total (0% complete)


4. Requirements

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Non-goals

The reverse case, where a web page on a private network sends requests for non-private resources, is common and is not considered an attack case that we are trying to prevent.

Stage 2: Design

5. Functional specification

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6. User experience design

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Stage 3: Planning

7. Implementation plan

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8. Reviews

Security review

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Privacy review

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Localization review

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Accessibility

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Quality Assurance review

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Operations review

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Stage 4: Development

9. Implementation

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Stage 5: Release

10. Landing criteria

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Feature details

Priority P2
Rank 999
Theme / Goal Product Hardening
Roadmap Security
Secondary roadmap `
Feature list `
Project `
Engineering team Networking

Team status notes

  status notes
Products ` `
Engineering ` `
Security ` `
Privacy ` `
Localization ` `
Accessibility ` `
Quality assurance ` `
User experience ` `
Product marketing ` `
Operations ` `