Bugzilla Review Trackers
|Threat||Proposed Mitigations||Threat Agent||Rating||Likelihood||Notes||Impact||Notes||Status|
|Compromise of consumer key could allow attackers to impersonate Mozilla to 3rd party services||Ensure that consumer keys are isolated from user interactive environments. Ideally the worker services should be isolated from the front end servers and share submission functions (further recommendations are available in the asynchronous architecture documentation)||Malicious Insider / Skilled Attacker||6||2||3||Attacker would be able to spoof Mozilla F1 to 3rd parties, but only on behalf of users; requires additional user interaction or an additional attack vector to succeed.|
|Compromise of server could permit ongoing collection of Oauth tokens for access to user accounts||Implement hardened environments and intrusion detection to reduce the likelihood of compromise. The f1 environment should be tightly segregated to prevent exfiltration of data to the extent possible. Ensure that tokens are held on the server only as long as strictly necessary, are not logged, and cleared before they are garbage collected. It is also possible to implement a token rotation mechanism||Malicious Insider / Skilled Attacker||8||2||4||User accounts at 3rd party services would be compromised.|
|Oauth Tokens for some service are overly permissive (i.e. Google tokens grant full access)||[Out of Mozilla\'s Control] Document and advise users of the potential implications of abuse of the tokens. We can work with 3rd parties to recommend more granular access controls.||Malicious Insider / Skilled Attacker||15||5||There are at least two of the services that suffer from this issue.||3||A compromised token for the affected services would allow full control over the account|
|Compromise of the service will result in significant damage to Mozilla\'s reputation||Ensure that rehearsed Incident Response practices are in place. Have effective, clear, and open communication ready in case an incident occurs. Ensure that ownership and clear lines of responsibility exist for each component of the service.||Government / Media / Lawyers||4||2||2|
|3rd Party Service Changes could render portions of F1 inoperable||Ensure that worker components that depend on communications with 3rd parties are isolated by process to prevent issues with one service affecting other components of F1||Public Attacker||6||3||2|
|Users flooding service could exhaust API call limits||Implement rate limiting of share requests. Where possible, work with 3rd parties to improve notification of potential abuse. Implement attack aware capabilities in services similar to sync.||Public Attacker||8||4||2|
|Intrusion Monitoring requirements may impact privacy requirements||Develop CEF logging points that capture the data needed to monitor the environment properly without retaining privacy impacting data.||Government / Lawyers||9||3||3||Violation of our privacy policies|
|Unauthorized or unexpected code or system change could have a significant compliance and policy implication||Ensure strong change control practices are implemented, and detective controls such as file system integrity and audit logging are implemented. Ensure that any code change that modifies interactions between the client and the server, or the server and third parties is reviewed and signed off by security, IT, DEV before they hit production.||Malicious Insider / Skilled Attacker||16||4||4||Violation of our privacy policies, potential exposure to new vulnerabilities|
|Subpoenas/NSLs could force Mozilla to disclose logs of user communications||Ensure that reasonable data retention limits are observed. Anonymize source and destination data, limit the collection of log data to information necessary to maintain and develop the service. If push come to shove, shut down service.||Government / Lawyers||9||3||3||Violation of our privacy policies, and major reputational damage.|
|MitM – Attacker between F1 Client and Server||Ensure that STS is used, disable HTTP on the server, ensure that chrome panes properly surface certificate errors.||Public Attacker (close to user)||12||4||3||An attacker can gain control of user account information, and the ability to modify shares in transit|
|MitM Attacks against F1 Server and 3rd parties||Ensure that all configured services use HTTPS. Work with 3rd party providers to ensure that all services used by F1 are able to be used via HTTPS if they cannot. Ensure that server code properly verifies certificates (python has issues with this).||Public Attacker / ISP / Government||6||2||3||An attacker would gain control over all user accounts that F1 interacts, and the ability to modify share requests destined for the affected service.|
|Phishing – A malicious site could impersonate the F1 Settings Page||Load the F1 settings page in a fashion that distinguishes it from a normal web site.||Public Attacker||9||3||3||Trick a user into granting a malicious service Oauth authorization|
|Chrome code injection||Code review and security testing, including automated testing.||Public Attacker||8||2||4||A chrome code injection flaw would allow an attacker to inject code into the browser at a high level of privilege.|
- A specific incident and response plan needs to be develop to handle issues with F1.
- Availability beyond single data center (DR considerations) should be completed.
- IT / DEV will need to have formal change control procedures put in place when it comes to changes to these environments. Security/Privacy will need to be involved in any change and approve changes which could adversely affect these areas.
- Logging Infrastructure / Security Monitoring will need to be expanded to handle the increase in load.
- Proactive Security testing will need to be expanded beyond current set to include the f1 service