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Security/Server Side TLS

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The goal of this document is to help operational teams with the configuration of TLS on servers. All Mozilla sites and deployment should follow the recommendations below.

The Operations Security (OpSec) team maintains this document as a reference guide to navigate the TLS landscape. It contains information on TLS protocols, known issues and vulnerabilities, configuration examples and testing tools. Changes are reviewed and merged by the OpSec team, and broadcasted to the various Operational teams.

Version Editor Changes
3.7 ulfr cleanup version table (marumari), add F5 conf samples (warburtron), add notes about DHE (rgacogne)
3.6 ulfr bump intermediate DHE to 2048, add note about java compatibility
3.5 alm comment on weakdh vulnerability
3.4 ulfr added note about session resumption, HSTS, and HPKP
3.3 ulfr fix SHA256 prio, add POODLE details, update various templates
3.2 ulfr Added intermediate compatibility mode, renamed other modes
3.1 ulfr Added non-backward compatible ciphersuite
3 ulfr Remove RC4 for 3DES, fix ordering in openssl 0.9.8 (1024430), various minor updates
2.5.1 ulfr Revisit ELB capabilities
2.5 ulfr Update ZLB information for OCSP Stapling and ciphersuite
2.4 ulfr Moved a couple of aes128 above aes256 in the ciphersuite
2.3 ulfr Precisions on IE 7/8 AES support (thanks to Dobin Rutishauser)
2.2 ulfr Added IANA/OpenSSL/GnuTLS correspondence table and conversion tool
2.1 ulfr RC4 vs 3DES discussion. r=joes r=tinfoil
2.0 ulfr, kang Public release.
1.5 ulfr, kang added details for PFS DHE handshake, added nginx configuration details; added Apache recommended conf
1.4 ulfr revised ciphersuite. Prefer AES before RC4. Prefer 128 before 256. Prefer DHE before non-DHE.
1.3 ulfr added netscaler example conf
1.2 ulfr ciphersuite update, bump DHE-AESGCM above ECDH-RC4
1.1 ulfr, kang integrated review comments from Infra; SPDY information
1.0 ulfr creation
 
Document Status: READY
OpSec.png

Updates to this page should be submitted to the source repository on github.

If you are looking for the configuration generator, follow this link: https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/.

Recommended configurations

Three configurations are recommended. Pick the right configuration depending on your audience. If you do not need backward compatibility, and are building a service for modern clients only (post FF27), then use the Modern configuration. Otherwise, prefer the Intermediate configuration. Use the Old backward compatible configuration only if your service will be accessed by very old clients, such as Windows XP IE6, or ancient libraries & bots.

Configuration Oldest compatible client
Modern Firefox 27, Chrome 22, IE 11, Opera 14, Safari 7, Android 4.4, Java 8
Intermediate Firefox 1, Chrome 1, IE 7, Opera 5, Safari 1, Windows XP IE8, Android 2.3, Java 7
Old Windows XP IE6, Java 6

Modern compatibility

For services that don't need backward compatibility, the parameters below provide a higher level of security. This configuration is compatible with Firefox 27, Chrome 22, IE 11, Opera 14 and Safari 7.

  • Ciphersuite: ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!3DES:!MD5:!PSK
  • Versions: TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2
  • RSA key size: 2048
  • DH Parameter size: 2048
  • Elliptic curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 (at a minimum)
  • Certificate signature: SHA-256
  • HSTS: max-age=15724800

Intermediate compatibility (default)

For services that don't need compatibility with legacy clients (mostly WinXP), but still need to support a wide range of clients, this configuration is recommended. It is is compatible with Firefox 1, Chrome 1, IE 7, Opera 5 and Safari 1.

  • Ciphersuite: ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES:CAMELLIA:DES-CBC3-SHA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA
  • Versions: TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2
  • RSA key size: 2048
  • DH Parameter size: 2048 (see DHE and Java for details)
  • Elliptic curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 (at a minimum)
  • Certificate signature: SHA-256

Old backward compatibility

This is the old ciphersuite that works with all clients back to Windows XP/IE6. It should be used as a last resort only.

  • Ciphersuite: ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES:DES-CBC3-SHA:HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA
  • Versions: SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2
  • RSA key size: 2048
  • DH Parameter size: 1024 (see Pre-defined DHE groups)
  • Elliptic curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1
  • Certificate signature: SHA-1 (windows XP pre-sp3 is incompatible with sha-256)

If your version of OpenSSL is old, unavailable ciphers will be discarded automatically. Always use the full ciphersuite above and let OpenSSL pick the ones it supports.

The ordering of a ciphersuite is very important because it decides which algorithms are going to be selected in priority. The recommendation above prioritizes algorithms that provide perfect forward secrecy.

The listing below shows the list of algorithms returned by this ciphersuite. If you have to pick them manually for your application, make sure you keep this ordering.

Older versions of OpenSSL may not return the full list of algorithms. AES-GCM and some ECDHE are fairly recent, and not present on most versions of OpenSSL shipped with Ubuntu or RHEL. This listing below was obtained from a freshly built OpenSSL.

$ openssl ciphers -V 'ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES:DES-CBC3-SHA:HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA'|column -t
0xC0,0x2F  -  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256    TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=AESGCM(128)    Mac=AEAD
0xC0,0x2B  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256  TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=AESGCM(128)    Mac=AEAD
0xC0,0x30  -  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384    TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=AESGCM(256)    Mac=AEAD
0xC0,0x2C  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=AESGCM(256)    Mac=AEAD
0x00,0x9E  -  DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256      TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=AESGCM(128)    Mac=AEAD
0x00,0xA2  -  DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256      TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=AESGCM(128)    Mac=AEAD
0x00,0xA3  -  DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384      TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=AESGCM(256)    Mac=AEAD
0x00,0x9F  -  DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384      TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=AESGCM(256)    Mac=AEAD
0xC0,0x27  -  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256        TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA256
0xC0,0x23  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256      TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA256
0xC0,0x13  -  ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           SSLv3    Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA1
0xC0,0x09  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA         SSLv3    Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA1
0xC0,0x28  -  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384        TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA384
0xC0,0x24  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384      TLSv1.2  Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA384
0xC0,0x14  -  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           SSLv3    Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA1
0xC0,0x0A  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA         SSLv3    Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x67  -  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256          TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA256
0x00,0x33  -  DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA             SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x40  -  DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256          TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA256
0x00,0x6B  -  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256          TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA256
0x00,0x38  -  DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA             SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x39  -  DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA             SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA1
0xC0,0x12  -  ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA         SSLv3    Kx=ECDH  Au=RSA    Enc=3DES(168)      Mac=SHA1
0xC0,0x08  -  ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA       SSLv3    Kx=ECDH  Au=ECDSA  Enc=3DES(168)      Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x9C  -  AES128-GCM-SHA256              TLSv1.2  Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=AESGCM(128)    Mac=AEAD
0x00,0x9D  -  AES256-GCM-SHA384              TLSv1.2  Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=AESGCM(256)    Mac=AEAD
0x00,0x3C  -  AES128-SHA256                  TLSv1.2  Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA256
0x00,0x3D  -  AES256-SHA256                  TLSv1.2  Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA256
0x00,0x2F  -  AES128-SHA                     SSLv3    Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x35  -  AES256-SHA                     SSLv3    Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x6A  -  DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256          TLSv1.2  Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=AES(256)       Mac=SHA256
0x00,0x32  -  DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA             SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=AES(128)       Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x0A  -  DES-CBC3-SHA                   SSLv3    Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=3DES(168)      Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x88  -  DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA        SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=Camellia(256)  Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x87  -  DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA        SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=Camellia(256)  Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x84  -  CAMELLIA256-SHA                SSLv3    Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=Camellia(256)  Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x45  -  DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA        SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=RSA    Enc=Camellia(128)  Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x44  -  DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA        SSLv3    Kx=DH    Au=DSS    Enc=Camellia(128)  Mac=SHA1
0x00,0x41  -  CAMELLIA128-SHA                SSLv3    Kx=RSA   Au=RSA    Enc=Camellia(128)  Mac=SHA1

The ciphers are described here: http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html

Prioritization logic

  1. ECDHE+AESGCM ciphers are selected first. These are TLS 1.2 ciphers and not widely supported at the moment. No known attack currently target these ciphers.
  2. PFS ciphersuites are preferred, with ECDHE first, then DHE.
  3. SHA256 signature is preferred to SHA-1 in ciphers and certificates. MD5 is disallowed entirely.
  4. AES 128 is preferred to AES 256. There has been [discussions] on whether AES256 extra security was worth the cost, and the result is far from obvious. At the moment, AES128 is preferred, because it provides good security, is really fast, and seems to be more resistant to timing attacks.
  5. In the backward compatible ciphersuite, AES is preferred to 3DES. BEAST attacks on AES are mitigated in TLS 1.1 and above, and difficult to achieve in TLS 1.0. In the non-backward compatible ciphersuite, 3DES is not present.
  6. RC4 is removed entirely. 3DES is used for backward compatibility. See discussion in #RC4_weaknesses

Mandatory discards

  • aNULL contains non-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, that are subject to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks
  • eNULL contains null-encryption ciphers (cleartext)
  • EXPORT are legacy weak ciphers that were marked as exportable by US law
  • RC4 contains ciphers that use the deprecated ARCFOUR algorithm
  • DES contains ciphers that use the deprecated Data Encryption Standard
  • SSLv2 contains all ciphers that were defined in the old version of the SSL standard, now deprecated
  • MD5 contains all the ciphers that use the deprecated message digest 5 as the hashing algorithm

Forward Secrecy

The concept of forward secrecy is simple: client and server negotiate a key that never hits the wire, and is destroyed at the end of the session. The RSA private from the server is used to sign a Diffie-Hellman key exchange between the client and the server. The pre-master key obtained from the Diffie-Hellman handshake is then used for encryption. Since the pre-master key is specific to a connection between a client and a server, and used only for a limited amount of time, it is called Ephemeral.

With Forward Secrecy, if an attacker gets a hold of the server's private key, it will not be able to decrypt past communications. The private key is only used to sign the DH handshake, which does not reveal the pre-master key. Diffie-Hellman ensures that the pre-master keys never leave the client and the server, and cannot be intercepted by a MITM.

DHE handshake and dhparam

When an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman cipher is used, the server and the client negotiate a pre-master key using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. This algorithm requires that the server sends the client a prime number and a generator. Neither are confidential, and are sent in clear text. However, they must be signed, such that a MITM cannot hijack the handshake.

As an example, TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 works as follow:

server key exchange message as displayed in Wireshark
client key exchange message as displayed in Wireshark
  1. Server sends Client a [SERVER KEY EXCHANGE] message during the SSL Handshake. The message contains:
    1. Prime number p
    2. Generator g
    3. Server's Diffie-Hellman public value A = g^X mod p, where X is a private integer chosen by the server at random, and never shared with the client. (note: A is called pubkey in wireshark)
    4. signature S of the above (plus two random values) computed using the Server's private RSA key
  2. Client verifies the signature S
  3. Client sends server a [CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE] message. The message contains:
    1. Client's Diffie-Hellman public value B = g^Y mod p, where Y is a private integer chosen at random and never shared. (note: B is called pubkey in wireshark)
  4. The Server and the Client can now calculate the pre-master secret using each other's public values:
    1. server calculates PMS = B^X mod p
    2. client calculates PMS = A^Y mod p
  5. Client sends a [CHANGE CIPHER SPEC] message to the server, and both parties continue the handshake using ENCRYPTED HANDSHAKE MESSAGES

The size of the prime number p constrains the size of the pre-master key PMS, because of the modulo operation. A smaller prime almost means weaker values of A and B, which could leak the secret values X and Y. Thus, the prime p should not be smaller than the size of the RSA private key.

$ openssl dhparam 2048
Generating DH parameters, 2048 bit long safe prime, generator 2
..+..+...............+
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
MBYCEQCHU6UNZoHMF6bPtj21Hn/bAgEC.....
......
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----

Pre-defined DHE groups

In order to lower the burden of system administrators, several servers provide pre-computed DH groups. Unfortunately, the [[1] report showed that it is very likely that a state-level adversary may have broken the most widely used 1024-bit DH group, Oakley group 2, standardized in [[2]].

For this reason, the use of this group is considered unsafe and you should either:

  • use a larger group, with a minimum size of 2048-bit, as recommended in the intermediate and modern configurations ;
  • keep using a 1024-bit DH group if you need to (see #DHE_and_Java), but move away from Oakley group 2 and use a custom DH group instead, generated via the openssl dhparam 1024 command ;
  • disable DHE altogether, relying on ECHDE for PFS if you don't support legacy clients lacking ECDHE support (see #DHE_and_ECHDE_support).

It is currently assumed that standardized 2048 bits DH groups provide sufficient security to resist factorization attacks. However, the careful administrator should generate a random DH group instead of using a standardized one when setting up a new server, as advised by the [[3]] authors.

DHE and ECDHE support

Most modern clients that support both ECDHE and DHE typically prefer the former, because ECDHE provides faster handshakes than DHE ([[4]], [[5]]).

Unfortunately, some widely used clients lack support for ECDHE and must then rely on DHE to provide perfect forward secrecy:

  • Android < 3.0.0
  • Java < 7
  • OpenSSL < 1.0.0

Note that schannel on Windows XP technically support DHE, but only with DSA keys, making it unusable on the internet in practice.

DHE and Java

Java 6 and 7 do not support Diffie-Hellman parameters larger than 1024 bits. If your server expects to receive connections from java 6 clients and wants to enable PFS, it must provide a DHE parameter of 1024 bits.

If keeping the compatibility with Java < 7 is a necessity, thus preventing the use of large DH keys, three solutions are available:

  • using custom 1024-bit DH parameters, different from Oakley group 2 ;
  • if the software used does not support custom DH parameters, like Apache HTTPd < 2.2.30, it is possible to keep using the 1024-bit DH Oakley group 2, knowing these clients will be at risk from a state-level adversary ;
  • it is also possible to completely disable DHE. This means that clients not supporting ECDHE will be reverting to static RSA, giving up Forward Secrecy.

The case of Java 7 is a bit different. Java 7 supports ECDHE ciphers, so if the server provides ECDHE and prioritizes it before DHE ciphers using server side ordering, then Java 7 will use ECDHE and not care about the size of the DHE parameter. In this situation, the server can use 2048 bits DHE parameters for all other clients.

However, if the server does not support ECDHE, then Java 7 will use DHE and fail if the parameter is larger than 1024 bits. When failing, the handshake will not attempt to fall back to the next cipher in line, but simply fail with the error "java.lang.RuntimeException: Could not generate DH keypair".

Java supported ECDHE prioritized smallest DH parameter size
6 irrelevant 1024
7 NO 1024
7 YES 2048
8 irrelevant 2048


OCSP Stapling

When connecting to a server, clients should verify the validity of the server certificate using either a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or an Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) record. The problem with CRL is that the lists have grown huge and takes forever to download.

OCSP is much more lightweight, as only one record is retrieved at a time. But the side effect is that OCSP requests must be made to a 3rd party OCSP responder when connecting to a server, which adds latency and potential failures. In fact, the OCSP responders operated by CAs are often so unreliable that browser will fail silently if no response is received in a timely manner. This reduces security, by allowing an attacker to DoS an OCSP responder to disable the validation.

The solution is to allow the server to send its cached OCSP record during the TLS handshake, therefore bypassing the OCSP responder. This mechanism saves a roundtrip between the client and the OCSP responder, and is called OCSP Stapling.

The server will send a cached OCSP response only if the client requests it, by announcing support for the status_request TLS extension in its CLIENT HELLO.

OCSP Stapling.png

Most servers will cache OCSP response for up to 48 hours. At regular intervals, the server will connect to the OCSP responder of the CA to retrieve a fresh OCSP record. The location of the OCSP responder is taken from the Authority Information Access field of the signed certificate. For example, with StartSSL:

Authority Information Access: 
      OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.startssl.com/sub/class1/server/ca

Support for OCSP Stapling can be tested using the -status option of the OpenSSL client.

$ openssl s_client -connect monitor.mozillalabs.com:443 -status
...
======================================
OCSP Response Data:
    OCSP Response Status: successful (0x0)
    Response Type: Basic OCSP Response
    Version: 1 (0x0)
...

Session Resumption

Session Resumption is the ability to reuse the session secrets previously negotiated between a client and a server for a new TLS connection. This feature greatly increases the speed establishment of TLS connections after the first handshake, and is very useful for connections that use Perfect Forward Secrecy with a slow handshake like DHE.

Session Resumption can be performed using one of two methods:

  1. session identifier: When establishing a first session, the server generates an arbitrary session ID sent to the client. On subsequent connections, the client sends the session ID in the CLIENT HELLO message, indicating to the server it wants to reuse an existing state. If the server can find a corresponding state in its local cache, it reuse the session secrets and skips directly to exchanging encrypted data with the client. If the cache stored on the server is compromised, session keys from the cache can be used to decrypt past and future sessions.
  2. session tickets: Storing a cache on the server might be problematic for systems that handle very large numbers of clients. Session tickets provide an alternative where the server sends the encrypted state (ticket) to the client instead of storing it in its local cache. The client can send back the encrypted state to the server in subsequent connections, thus allowing session resumption. This method requires symmetric keys on the server to encrypt and decrypt session tickets. If the keys are compromised, an attacker obtains access to session keys and can decrypt past and future sessions.

Session resumption is a very useful performance feature of TLS, but also carries a significant amount of risk. Most servers do not purge sessions or ticket keys, thus increasing the risk that a server compromise would leak data from previous (and future) connections.

The current recommendation for web servers is to enable session resumption and benefit from the performance improvement, but to restart servers daily when possible. This ensure that sessions get purged and ticket keys get renewed on a regular basis.

HSTS: HTTP Strict Transport Security

[HSTS] is a HTTP header sent by a server to a client, indicating that the current site must only be accessed over HTTPS until expiration of the HSTS value is reached.

The header format is very simple, composed only of a max-age parameter that indicates when the directive should expire. max-age is expressed in seconds. A typical value is 15724800 seconds, or 6 months.

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15724800

HSTS is becoming more and more of a standard, but should only be used when the site's operators are confident that HTTPS will be available continuously for the duration of max-age. Once the HSTS header is sent to client, HTTPS cannot be disabled on the site until the last client has expired its HSTS record.

HPKP: Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP

See [RFC7469].

HPKP is an experimental HTTP header sent by a server to a client, to indicate that some certificates related to the site should be pinned in the client. The client would thus refuse to establish a connection to the server if the pining does not comply.

Due to its experimental nature, HPKP is currently not recommended on production sites. More informations can be found on the [MDN description page].

Recommended Server Configurations

Try out our configuration generator to create a sample configuration file for various servers. Click the image below:

Server-side-tls-config-generator.png

Nginx

Nginx provides OCSP Stapling, custom DH parameters, and the full flavor of TLS versions (from OpenSSL).

The detail of each configuration parameter, and how to build a recent Nginx with OpenSSL, is at the end of this document.

server {
    listen 443 ssl;

    # certs sent to the client in SERVER HELLO are concatenated in ssl_certificate
    ssl_certificate /path/to/signed_cert_plus_intermediates;
    ssl_certificate_key /path/to/private_key;
    ssl_session_timeout 5m;
    ssl_session_cache shared:SSL:5m;

    # Diffie-Hellman parameter for DHE ciphersuites, recommended 2048 bits
    ssl_dhparam /path/to/dhparam.pem;

    # Intermediate configuration. tweak to your needs.
    ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;
    ssl_ciphers '<paste intermediate ciphersuite here>';
    ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
 
    # Enable this if your want HSTS (recommended)
    # add_header Strict-Transport-Security max-age=15768000;
 
    # OCSP Stapling ---
    # fetch OCSP records from URL in ssl_certificate and cache them
    ssl_stapling on;
    ssl_stapling_verify on;
    ## verify chain of trust of OCSP response using Root CA and Intermediate certs
    ssl_trusted_certificate /path/to/root_CA_cert_plus_intermediates;
    resolver <IP DNS resolver>;
 
    ....
}

Apache

Apache supports OCSP Stapling, but only in httpd 2.3.3 and later.

Before Apache 2.4.7, the DH parameter is always set to 1024 bits and is not user configurable. This has been fixed in mod_ssl 2.4.7 that Red Hat has backported into their RHEL 6 Apache 2.2 distribution with httpd-2.2.15-32.el6. Future versions of Apache will automatically select a better value for the DH parameter.

<VirtualHost *:443>
    ...
    SSLEngine on
    SSLCertificateFile      /path/to/signed_certificate
    SSLCertificateChainFile /path/to/intermediate_certificate
    SSLCertificateKeyFile   /path/to/private/key
    SSLCACertificateFile    /path/to/all_ca_certs

    # Intermediate configuration, tweak to your needs
    SSLProtocol             all -SSLv2 -SSLv3
    SSLCipherSuite          <paste intermediate ciphersuite here>
    SSLHonorCipherOrder     on
    SSLCompression          off

    # OCSP Stapling, only in httpd 2.3.3 and later
    SSLUseStapling          on
    SSLStaplingResponderTimeout 5
    SSLStaplingReturnResponderErrors off
    # On Apache 2.4+, SSLStaplingCache must be set *outside* of the VirtualHost
    SSLStaplingCache        shmcb:/var/run/ocsp(128000)
 
    # Enable this if your want HSTS (recommended)
    # Header add Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15768000"
 
    ...
</VirtualHost>
# TLS Session cache, outside of virtual host, apache 2.4+
# the path doesn't need to exist
SSLSessionCache         shmcb:/path/to/ssl_gcache_data(5120000)

Haproxy

SSL support in Haproxy is stable in 1.5. Haproxy supports OCSP Stapling and custom DH parameters size. It can be used as a TLS termination in AWS using ELBs and the PROXY protocol. See Guidelines for HAProxy termination in AWS

global
    # set default parameters to the Intermediate configuration
    tune.ssl.default-dh-param 2048
    ssl-default-bind-ciphers <paste intermediate ciphersuite here>

frontend ft_test
    mode    http
    bind    0.0.0.0:443 ssl no-sslv3 crt /path/to/<cert+privkey+intermediate+dhparam>
    # Enable this if your want HSTS (recommended)
    # rspadd  Strict-Transport-Security:\ max-age=15768000

OCSP Stapling support

While HAProxy can serve OCSP stapled responses, it cannot fetch and update OCSP records from the CA automatically. The OCSP response must be downloaded by another process and placed next to the certificate, with a '.ocsp' extension.

/etc/haproxy/certs/
├── ca.pem
├── server_cert.pem
├── server_bundle.pem
└── server_bundle.pem.ocsp

The file 'server_bundle.pem.ocsp' must be retrieved and updated at regular intervals. A cronjob can be used for this:

$ openssl ocsp -noverify -issuer /etc/haproxy/certs/ca.pem \
-cert /etc/haproxy/certs/server_cert.pem \
-url http://ocsp.startssl.com/sub/class1/server/ca \
-no_nonce -header Host ocsp.startssl.com \
-respout /etc/haproxy/certs/server_bundle.pem.ocsp

The URL above is taken from the server certificate:

$ openssl x509 -in server_cert.pem -text | grep OCSP
OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.startssl.com/sub/class1/server/ca

Stud

Stud is a lightweight SSL termination proxy. It's basically a wrapper for OpenSSL. Stud is not being heavily developed, and features such as OCSP stapling are missing. But it is very lightweight and efficient, and with a recent openssl, supports all the TLS 1.2 ciphers.

# SSL x509 certificate file. REQUIRED.
# List multiple certs to use SNI. Certs are used in the order they
# are listed; the last cert listed will be used if none of the others match
#
# type: string
pem-file = "<concatenate cert + privkey + dhparam>"
 
# SSL protocol.
#
tls = on
ssl = on
 
# List of allowed SSL ciphers.
#
# Run openssl ciphers for list of available ciphers.
# type: string
ciphers = "<paste intermediate ciphersuite here>"
 
# Enforce server cipher list order
#
# type: boolean
prefer-server-ciphers = on

Amazon Web Services Elastic Load Balancer (AWS ELB)

The ELB service supports TLS 1.2 and ciphers ordering, but lacks support for custom DH parameters and OCSP Stapling.

The default configuration of ELBs has old settings, that can be customized in the Web Console or via the API. We recommend that you use the Security/Server_Side_TLS#elb_ciphers.py to enforce the right TLS configuration on an elastic load balancer.

Below is a side-by-side comparison of the 'intermediate' recommended configuration versus the default ELB configuration. The top ciphers are the same, but SSLv3 and various deprecated ciphers are removed from the intermediate configuration.

= INTERMEDIATE configuration =                                               |  = default ELB configuration =
                                                                             |
prio  ciphersuite                  protocols              pfs_keysize        |  prio  ciphersuite                  protocols                    pfs_keysize
1     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256  TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits |  1     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256  TLSv1.2                      ECDH,P-256,256bits
2     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256      TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits |  2     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256      TLSv1.2                      ECDH,P-256,256bits
3     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits |  3     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits
4     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits |  4     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2                      ECDH,P-256,256bits
5     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384      TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits |  5     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384      TLSv1.2                      ECDH,P-256,256bits
6     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits |  6     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits
7     AES128-GCM-SHA256            TLSv1.2                                   |  7     AES128-GCM-SHA256            TLSv1.2
8     AES128-SHA256                TLSv1.2                                   |  8     AES128-SHA256                TLSv1.2
9     AES128-SHA                   TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2                     |  9     AES128-SHA                   SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
10    AES256-GCM-SHA384            TLSv1.2                                   |  10    AES256-GCM-SHA384            TLSv1.2
11    AES256-SHA256                TLSv1.2                                   |  11    AES256-SHA256                TLSv1.2
12    AES256-SHA                   TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2                     |  12    AES256-SHA                   SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
13    DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,1024bits        |  13    DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,1024bits
14    CAMELLIA128-SHA              TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2                     |  14    ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA            SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits
15    DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384    TLSv1.2                DH,1024bits        |  15    RC4-SHA                      SSLv3,TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
16    DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256        TLSv1.2                DH,1024bits        |
17    DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,1024bits        |  Certificate: trusted, 2048 bit, sha256WithRSAEncryption signature
18    CAMELLIA256-SHA              TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2                     |  TLS ticket lifetime hint: 300
19    DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256    TLSv1.2                DH,1024bits        |  OCSP stapling: not supported
20    DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256        TLSv1.2                DH,1024bits        |
                                                                             |
Certificate: trusted, 2048 bit, sha256WithRSAEncryption signature            |
TLS ticket lifetime hint: 300                                                |
OCSP stapling: not supported                                                 |

If you want better control over TLS than ELB provide, another option in AWS is to terminate SSL on HAproxy, using the PROXY protocol between ELB and HAproxy. https://jve.linuxwall.info/ressources/taf/haproxy-aws/

Zeus Load Balancer(Riverbed Stingray)

ZLB supports TLS1.2 and OCSP Stapling. It lacks support for Elliptic Curves and AES-GCM. As of Riverbed Steelhead 9.6, TLS parameters are configurable per site.

The recommended prioritization is:

  1. SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  2. SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  3. SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
  4. SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
  5. SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

The following strings can be used directly in the ZLB configuration, under global settings > ssl3_ciphers. with 3DES

SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

without 3DES

SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,SSL_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

While the recommended DH prime size is 2048, problems with client libraries, such as Java 6/7, make this impossible to deploy for now. Therefore, a DH prime of 1024 bits should be used until all clients are compatible with larger primes.

Citrix Netscaler

There is an issue with Netscaler's TLS1.2 and DHE ciphers. When DHE is used, the TLS handshake fails with a fatal 'Decode error'. TLS1.2 works fine with AES and RC4 ciphers.

Netscaler documentation is at http://support.citrix.com/proddocs/topic/netscaler-traffic-management-10-map/ns-ssl-supported-ciphers-list-ref.html

The configuration sample below shows how a default ciphersuite object can be created and attached to a vserver.

First, create a default ciphersuite that can be used in all vservers.

> add ssl cipher MozillaDefault
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName TLS1-DHE-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName TLS1-DHE-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName TLS1-DHE-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName TLS1-DHE-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName TLS1-AES-128-CBC-SHA
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName TLS1-AES-256-CBC-SHA
> bind ssl cipher MozillaDefault -cipherName SSL3-DES-CBC3-SHA

Second, create a DH parameter. If backward compatibility with Java 6/7 isn't needed, use 2048 instead of 1024.

> create ssl dhparam /nsconfig/ssl/dh1024.pem 1024 -gen 5

Third, configure the vserver to use the default ciphersuite and DH parameter.

> add ssl certKey <domain> -cert <cert> -key <key>
> add ssl certKey <intermediateCertName> -cert <intermediateCertName>
> link ssl certKey <domain> <intermediateCertName>
> set ssl vserver <domain>:https -eRSA ENABLED
> bind ssl vserver <domain>:https -cipherName MozillaDefault
> set ssl vserver <domain>:https -dh ENABLED -dhFile /nsconfig/ssl/dh1024.pem -dhCount 1000

The resulting configuration can be viewed with 'show ssl'

> show ssl vserver marketplace.firefox.com:https

    Advanced SSL configuration for VServer marketplace.firefox.com:https:
    DH: ENABLED    DHParam File: /nsconfig/ssl/dh1024.pem    Refresh Count: 1000
    Ephemeral RSA: ENABLED        Refresh Count: 0
    Session Reuse: ENABLED        Timeout: 120 seconds
    Cipher Redirect: DISABLED
    SSLv2 Redirect: DISABLED
    ClearText Port: 0
    Client Auth: DISABLED
    SSL Redirect: DISABLED
    Non FIPS Ciphers: DISABLED
    SNI: DISABLED
    SSLv2: DISABLED    SSLv3: ENABLED    TLSv1: ENABLED
    Push Encryption Trigger: Always
    Send Close-Notify: YES

1)    CertKey Name: marketplace.mozilla.org.san    Server Certificate
1)    Cipher Name: MozillaDefault    Description: User Created Cipher Group

Go

The Go standard library supports TLS1.2 and a limited subset of ECDHE and GCM ciphers. To configure a Go program accepting TLS connections, use the following code:

    config := tls.Config{
        MinVersion:               tls.VersionTLS10,
        PreferServerCipherSuites: true,
        CipherSuites: []uint16{
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
            tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA},
    }

F5 BIG-IP

BIG-IP uses SSL profiles which may be applied to one or multiple 'virtual servers' (VIPs). SSL profiles may use F5's default recommended cipher suites or may be manually configured to explicitly state which, and in what order, they are applied. SSL profiles can make use of multiple key types and support alternate key chains for each type (RSA, DSA and ECDSA). This can be performed either via the management web interface or via the TMOS command line (console or SSH).

Configuring Recommended Cipher-suites

To create a new SSL profile to conform to the Modern Compatibility cipher suite use the tmsh create profile command as follows...

tmsh create /ltm profile client-ssl moz_modern ciphers ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE+AES-GCM:
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:
DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!3DES:!MD5

Note that Null ciphers are automatically rejected and are only made available if explicitly allowed by the F5 administrator.

Currently DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 & DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 are not available in TMOS v11.6.x. This is expected to be resolved in an upcoming hotfix and the next major release of TMOS. The full list of support ciphers is available here: https://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/100/sol13163.html

To apply this new profile to an existing virtual server use either the management web interface or the following command line:

tmsh modify /ltm virtual my_virtual_server profiles add { moz_modern }

Any subsequenty changes to the SSL profile do not need to be manually re-applied to the LTM virtual server.

OCSP Stapling

Using the modify command allows us to easily add settings to our new SSL profile. Adding OCSP stapling is a 3 step process. First we must create a DNS resolver for outbound queries. Secondly we create our OCSP Stapling profile making use of this DNS resolver. Finally we add the OCSP Stapling profile to our SSL profile.

1. Creating the DNS resolver This command creates a DNS resolver for all domains (.) and uses Googles public DNS servers

tmsh create net dns-resolver myResolver forward-zones add { . { nameservers add { 8.8.8.8:53 } nameservers add { 8.8.4.4:53 } } }

2. Creating the OCSP Stapling profile The following command is used to create an OCSP stapling profile called myOCSP with our new DNS resolver myResolver

tmsh create ltm profile ocsp-stapling-params myOCSP dns-resolver myResolver trusted-ca ca-bundle.crt

3. Applying the OCSP Stapling profile to the DNS profile Using the modify command we will replace the default certificate and key in our existing SSL profile with the same default cert/key but, this time, making using of our new OCSP profile.

tmsh modify ltm profile client-ssl moz_modern cert-key-chain replace-all-with { default { cert default.crt key default.key ocsp-stapling-params myOCSP } }

Session Resumption

To enable session resumption using Session Tickets enable the option in the SSL profile via the management web interface or use the session-ticket enabled parameter when creating the profile at the command line. Again, we can use the modify command to append this to our existing moz_modern SSL profile.

For example:

tmsh modify /ltm profile client-ssl moz_modern session-ticket enabled

Viewing the config

To confirm the configuration of your new SSL profile and to ensure that it is correctly applied to your virtual server use the list command.

View your SSL profile:

tmsh list ltm profile client-ssl moz_modern

Which outputs all configuration paratmers of the profile called moz_modern:

ltm profile client-ssl moz_modern {
    app-service none
    cert-key-chain {
        default {
            cert default.crt
            key default.key
            ocsp-stapling-params myOCSP
        }
    }
    ciphers ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:!EXPORT:!DES:!RC4:!3DES:!MD5
    inherit-certkeychain true
    session-ticket enabled
}

And to check it is correctly applied to your virtual server:

list ltm virtual vs_myWebsite

Which should list the SSL profile by name:

ltm virtual vs_myWebsite {
    destination 10.0.0.100:https
    ip-protocol tcp
    mask 255.255.255.255
    pool pool_webServers
    profiles {
        http { }
        http2 { }
        manual_profile { }
        moz_modern {
            context clientside
        }
        spdy { }
        tcp { }
        wan-optimized-compression { }
    }
    rules { }
    source 0.0.0.0/0
    source-address-translation {
        type automap
    }
    vs-index 4
}

Enabling HSTS

iRules are F5's flexible scripting language and can be used to easily enable HSTS for any TLS website. The standard HTTP should have redirection configured to send users to the HTTPS site. The following simple iRule is then applied to the HTTPS virtual server to insert the HSTS header enabling the maximum allowed age and including sub domains.

when HTTP_RESPONSE {
   HTTP::header insert Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains"
}

CipherScan

See https://github.com/jvehent/cipherscan

Cipherscan is a small Bash script that connects to a target and list the preferred Ciphers. It's an easy way to test a web server for available ciphers, PFS key size, elliptic curves, support for OCSP Stapling, TLS ticket lifetime and certificate trust.

$ ./cipherscan jve.linuxwall.info
..........................
prio  ciphersuite                  protocols              pfs_keysize
1     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256  TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits
2     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits
3     DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384    TLSv1.2                DH,4096bits
4     DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256    TLSv1.2                DH,4096bits
5     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256      TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits
6     ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA         TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits
7     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384      TLSv1.2                ECDH,P-256,256bits
8     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA         TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits
9     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256        TLSv1.2                DH,4096bits
10    DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA           TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,4096bits
11    DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256        TLSv1.2                DH,4096bits
12    AES128-GCM-SHA256            TLSv1.2
13    AES256-GCM-SHA384            TLSv1.2
14    ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA       TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  ECDH,P-256,256bits
15    EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA         TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,4096bits
16    DES-CBC3-SHA                 TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
17    DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA           TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,4096bits
18    DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA      TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,4096bits
19    AES256-SHA256                TLSv1.2
20    AES256-SHA                   TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
21    CAMELLIA256-SHA              TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
22    DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA      TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2  DH,4096bits
23    AES128-SHA256                TLSv1.2
24    AES128-SHA                   TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2
25    CAMELLIA128-SHA              TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2

Certificate: trusted, 2048 bit, sha1WithRSAEncryption signature
TLS ticket lifetime hint: 300
OCSP stapling: supported

SSL Labs (Qualys)

Available here: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/

Qualys SSL Labs provides a comprehensive SSL testing suite.

GlobalSign has a modified interface of SSL Labs that is interesting as well: https://sslcheck.globalsign.com/

elb_ciphers.py

This python script uses boto to create a TLS policy and apply it to a given load balancer. Make sure you have an AWS access key configured in ~/.boto to use this script, then invoke it as follow:

$ python cipher.py us-east-1 stooge-lb-prod-1 modern
New Policy 'Mozilla-OpSec-TLS-Modern-v-3-2' created and applied to load balancer stooge-lb-prod-1 in us-east-1

If no mode is specified, the intermediate mode will be used. The modes are 'old', 'intermediate' and 'modern', and map to the recommended configurations.

#!/usr/bin/env python

# Apply recommendation from https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS

# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
#
# Contributors:
# Gene Wood [:gene]
# Julien Vehent [:ulfr]
# JP Schneider [:jp]

import boto.ec2.elb
import sys

if len(sys.argv) < 3:
  print "usage : %s REGION ELB-NAME <MODE>" % sys.argv[0]
  print ""
  print "Example : %s us-west-2 persona-org-0810" % sys.argv[0]
  print "MODE can be 'old', 'intermediate' (default) or 'modern'"
  print "see https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS"
  sys.exit(1)

region = sys.argv[1]
load_balancer_name = sys.argv[2]
try:
    conf_mode = sys.argv[3]
except IndexError:
    conf_mode = 'intermediate'
conn_elb = boto.ec2.elb.connect_to_region(region)

#import logging
#logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)

policy = {'old':{},
          'intermediate':{},
          'modern':{}}

policy['old']['name'] = 'Mozilla-OpSec-TLS-Old-v-3-3'
policy['old']['ciphersuite'] = {
                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256": True,
                "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256": True,
                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256": True,
                "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256": True,
                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA": True,
                "ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA": True,
                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384": True,
                "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384": True,
                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384": True,
                "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384": True,
                "ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA": True,
                "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA": True,
                "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256": False,
                "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384": False,
                "ADH-AES128-SHA": False,
                "ADH-AES128-SHA256": False,
                "ADH-AES256-SHA": False,
                "ADH-AES256-SHA256": False,
                "ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA": False,
                "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA": False,
                "ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA": False,
                "ADH-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "ADH-RC4-MD5": False,
                "ADH-SEED-SHA": False,
                "AES128-GCM-SHA256": True,
                "AES256-GCM-SHA384": True,
                "AES128-SHA": True,
                "AES128-SHA256": True,
                "AES256-SHA": True,
                "AES256-SHA256": True,
                "CAMELLIA128-SHA": True,
                "CAMELLIA256-SHA": True,
                "DES-CBC3-MD5": False,
                "DES-CBC3-SHA": True,
                "DES-CBC-MD5": False,
                "DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256": True,
                "DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384": True,
                "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA": True,
                "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256": True,
                "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA": True,
                "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256": True,
                "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA": False,
                "DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA": False,
                "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA": False,
                "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256": True,
                "DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384": True,
                "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA": True,
                "DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256": True,
                "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA": True,
                "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256": True,
                "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA": False,
                "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA": False,
                "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA": False,
                "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA": False,
                "EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA": False,
                "EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5": False,
                "EXP-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5": False,
                "EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5": False,
                "EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA": False,
                "EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5": False,
                "EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA": False,
                "EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5": False,
                "EXP-RC4-MD5": False,
                "IDEA-CBC-SHA": False,
                "KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5": False,
                "KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA": False,
                "KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5": False,
                "KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA": False,
                "KRB5-RC4-MD5": False,
                "KRB5-RC4-SHA": False,
                "PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA": False,
                "PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA": False,
                "PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA": False,
                "PSK-RC4-SHA": False,
                "RC2-CBC-MD5": False,
                "RC4-MD5": False,
                "RC4-SHA": False,
                "SEED-SHA": False,
                "Protocol-SSLv2": False,
                "Protocol-SSLv3": True,
                "Protocol-TLSv1": True,
                "Protocol-TLSv1.1": True,
                "Protocol-TLSv1.2": True,
                "Server-Defined-Cipher-Order": True
                }

# reuse the Old policy minus SSLv3 and 3DES
policy['intermediate']['name'] = 'Mozilla-OpSec-TLS-Intermediate-v-3-3'
policy['intermediate']['ciphersuite'] = policy['old']['ciphersuite'].copy()
policy['intermediate']['ciphersuite'].update(
    {"Protocol-SSLv3": False})

# reuse the intermediate policy minus TLSv1 and non PFS ciphers
policy['modern']['name'] = 'Mozilla-OpSec-TLS-Modern-v-3-3'
policy['modern']['ciphersuite'] = policy['intermediate']['ciphersuite'].copy()
policy['modern']['ciphersuite'].update(
    {"Protocol-TLSv1": False,
    "AES128-GCM-SHA256": False,
    "AES256-GCM-SHA384": False,
    "DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA": False,
    "AES128-SHA256": False,
    "AES128-SHA": False,
    "DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256": False,
    "AES256-SHA256": False,
    "AES256-SHA": False,
    "CAMELLIA128-SHA": False,
    "CAMELLIA256-SHA": False,
    "DES-CBC3-SHA": False})

if not conf_mode in policy.keys():
    print "Invalid policy name, must be one of %s" % policy.keys()
    sys.exit(1)

# Create the Ciphersuite Policy
params = {'LoadBalancerName': load_balancer_name,
          'PolicyName': policy[conf_mode]['name'],
          'PolicyTypeName': 'SSLNegotiationPolicyType'}
conn_elb.build_complex_list_params(
    params,
    [(x, policy[conf_mode]['ciphersuite'][x]) for x in policy[conf_mode]['ciphersuite'].keys()],
    'PolicyAttributes.member',
    ('AttributeName', 'AttributeValue'))
policy_result = conn_elb.get_list('CreateLoadBalancerPolicy', params, None, verb='POST')

# Apply the Ciphersuite Policy to your ELB
params = {'LoadBalancerName': load_balancer_name,
          'LoadBalancerPort': 443,
          'PolicyNames.member.1': policy[conf_mode]['name']}

result = conn_elb.get_list('SetLoadBalancerPoliciesOfListener', params, None)
print "New Policy '%s' created and applied to load balancer %s in %s" % (
    policy[conf_mode]['name'],
    load_balancer_name,
    region)

Appendices

Supported ciphers on various systems

On a variety of ~900 systems (RHEL5 & 6, CentOS 5 & 6 and Ubuntu), the following versions of OpenSSL were found:

37 OpenSSL 0.9.8e-fips-rhel5 01 Jul 2008
35 OpenSSL 0.9.8k 25 Mar 2009
777 OpenSSL 1.0.0-fips 29 Mar 2010
18 OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012

The recommended ciphersuite was tested on each system. The list below shows the ciphersuites supported by all tested systems. However old your setup may be, it is safe to assume that the following ciphers are going to be available:

  • RC4-SHA
  • DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
  • DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
  • AES128-SHA
  • AES256-SHA
  • DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
  • DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA

Attacks on SSL and TLS

BEAST CVE-2011-3389

Beast is a vulnerability in the Initialization Vector (IV) of the CBC mode of AES, Camellia and a few other ciphers that use CBC mode. The attack allows a MITM attacker to recover plaintext values by encrypting the same message multiple times.

BEAST is mitigated in TLS1.1 and above.

more: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-and-beast-ssl-attack

LUCKY13

Lucky13 is another attack on CBC mode that listen for padding checks to decrypt ciphertext.

more: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html

RC4 weaknesses

As of February 2015, the IETF explicitely prohibits the use of RC4: [RFC 7465].

It has been proven that RC4 biases in the first 256 bytes of a cipherstream can be used to recover encrypted text. If the same data is encrypted a very large number of times, then an attacker can apply statistical analysis to the results and recover the encrypted text. While hard to perform, this attack shows that it is time to remove RC4 from the list of trusted ciphers.

In a public discussion ([bug 927045]), it has been recommended to replace RC4 with 3DES. This would impact Internet Explorer 7 and 8 users that, depending on the OS, do not support AES, and will negotiate only RC4 or 3DES ciphers. Internet Explorer uses the cryptographic library “schannel”, which is OS dependent. schannel supports AES in Windows Vista, but not in Windows XP.

While 3DES provides more resistant cryptography, it is also 30 times slower and more cpu intensive than RC4. For large web infrastructure, the CPU cost of replacing 3DES with RC4 is non-zero. For this reason, we recommend that administrators evaluate their traffic patterns, and make the decision of replacing RC4 with 3DES on a per-case basis. At Mozilla, we evaluated that the impact on CPU usage is minor, and thus decided to replace RC4 with 3DES where backward compatibility is required.

CRIME CVE-2012-4929

The root cause of the problem is information leakage that occurs when data is compressed prior to encryption. If someone can repeatedly inject and mix arbitrary content with some sensitive and relatively predictable data, and observe the resulting encrypted stream, then he will be able to extract the unknown data from it.

more: https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssltls

BREACH

This is a more complex attack than CRIME, which does not require TLS-level compression (it still needs HTTP-level compression).

In order to be successful, it requires to:

  1. Be served from a server that uses HTTP-level compression
  2. Reflect user-input in HTTP response bodies
  3. Reflect a secret (such as a CSRF token) in HTTP response bodies

more: http://breachattack.com/

POODLE CVE-2014-3566

POODLE is an attack on the padding used by SSLv3. It is a significant improvement of the BEAST attack which led the cryptography community to recommend disabling SSLv3 globally.

If you can arrange the message to be the correct length then the last block is 15 arbitrary bytes and the padding length (15). Then you arrange an interesting byte to be in the last position of a different block and duplicate that block to the end. If the record is accepted, then you know what the last byte contained because it decrypted to 15. Thus the attacker needs to be able to control some of the plaintext in order to align things in the messages and needs to be able to burn lots of connections (256 per byte, roughly). Thus a secret needs to be repeated in connection after connection (i.e. a cookie).

source: Adam Langley in https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1076983#c29

Daniel Stenberg (Mozilla, cUrl) has a good description of the exploitability of POODLE in http://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2014/10/17/curl-is-no-poodle/

Our guidelines maintain support for SSLv3 in the Old configuration only. This is required for clients on Windows XP service pack 1 & 2 that do not have support for TLSv1.0. Internet Explorer and Chrome on those platforms are impacted. Mozilla wants to be reachable from very old clients, to allow them to download a better browser. Therefore, we maintain SSLv3 compatibility on a limited number of sites. But all sites that do not need that level of compatibility are encouraged to implement the Intermediate configuration

Logjam attack on weak Diffie-Hellman

The Logjam attack describes methods of attacking TLS servers supporting DHE export ciphers, and with weak (<= 1024 bit) Diffie Hellman groups. Modern TLS must use DH parameters of 2048 bits and above, or only use ECDHE. The modern configuration in this guide provide configurations that are not impacted by this issue. The intermediate and old configurations are impacted, and administrators are encourage to use DH parameters of 2048 bits wherever possible.

more: https://weakdh.org

SPDY

(see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPDY and http://www.chromium.org/spdy/spdy-protocol)

SPDY is a protocol that incorporate TLS, which attempts to reduce latency when loading pages. It is currently not an HTTP standard (albeit it is being drafted for HTTP 2.0), but is widely supported.

SPDY version 3 is vulnerable to the CRIME attack (see also http://zoompf.com/2012/09/explaining-the-crime-weakness-in-spdy-and-ssl) - this is due to the use of compression. Clients currently implement a non-standard hack in with gzip in order to circumvent the vulnerability. SPDY version 4 is planned to include a proper fix.

TLS tickets (RFC 5077)

Once a TLS handshake has been negociated between the server and the client, both may exchange a session ticket, which contains an AES-CBC 128bit key which can decrypt the session. This key is generally static and only regenerated when the web server is restarted (with recent versions of Apache, it's stored in a file and also kept upon restarts).

The current work-around is to disable RFC 5077 support.

more: https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/US-13-Daigniere-TLS-Secrets-Slides.pdf

Cipher names correspondence table

IANA, OpenSSL and GnuTLS use different naming for the same ciphers. The table below matches some of these ciphers:

hex value IANA OpenSSL GnuTLS NSS
0x00,0x00 TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL SSL_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
0x00,0x01 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 NULL-MD5 TLS_RSA_NULL_MD5 SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
0x00,0x02 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA NULL-SHA TLS_RSA_NULL_SHA1 SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x03 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-RC4-MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_ARCFOUR_40_MD5 SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
0x00,0x04 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 RC4-MD5 TLS_RSA_ARCFOUR_MD5 SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
0x00,0x05 TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RC4-SHA TLS_RSA_ARCFOUR_SHA1 SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0x00,0x06 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5 SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
0x00,0x07 TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA IDEA-CBC-SHA SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x08 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-DES-CBC-SHA SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x09 TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA DES-CBC-SHA SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0A TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_RSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x0B TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0C TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0D TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0E TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x0F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x10 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x11 TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x12 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x13 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1 SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x14 TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x15 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x16 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1 SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x17 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5 SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
0x00,0x18 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 ADH-RC4-MD5 TLS_DH_ANON_ARCFOUR_MD5 SSL_DH_ANON_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
0x00,0x19 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA SSL_DH_ANON_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x1A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x1B TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_DH_ANON_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x1E TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x1F TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA
0x00,0x20 TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA KRB5-RC4-SHA
0x00,0x21 TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x22 TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5 KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5
0x00,0x23 TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5 KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5
0x00,0x24 TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 KRB5-RC4-MD5
0x00,0x25 TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5 KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5
0x00,0x26 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x27 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA
0x00,0x28 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA EXP-KRB5-RC4-SHA
0x00,0x29 TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5
0x00,0x2A TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5
0x00,0x2B TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 EXP-KRB5-RC4-MD5
0x00,0x2C TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x2D TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x2E TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0x00,0x2F TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AES128-SHA TLS_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x30 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x31 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x32 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x33 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x34 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ADH-AES128-SHA TLS_DH_ANON_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x35 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AES256-SHA TLS_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x36 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x37 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x38 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x39 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x3A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ADH-AES256-SHA TLS_DH_ANON_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x3B TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 NULL-SHA256 TLS_RSA_NULL_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0x3C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 AES128-SHA256 TLS_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x3D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 AES256-SHA256 TLS_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x3E TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x3F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x40 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256

DES-CBC-MD5

TLS_DHE_DSS_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x41 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA128-SHA TLS_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x42 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x43 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x44 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x45 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x46 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA TLS_DH_ANON_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x67 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x68 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x69 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x6A TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256 TLS_DHE_DSS_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x6B TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x6C TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES128-SHA256 TLS_DH_ANON_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x6D TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 ADH-AES256-SHA256 TLS_DH_ANON_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0x84 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA CAMELLIA256-SHA TLS_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x85 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x86 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x87 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x88 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x89 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA TLS_DH_ANON_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_DH_ANON_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x8A TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA PSK-RC4-SHA TLS_PSK_SHA_ARCFOUR_SHA1
0x00,0x8B TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA TLS_PSK_SHA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x8C TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA TLS_PSK_SHA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x8D TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA TLS_PSK_SHA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x8E TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA TLS_DHE_PSK_SHA_ARCFOUR_SHA1
0x00,0x8F TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_PSK_SHA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x90 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_PSK_SHA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x91 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_PSK_SHA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1
0x00,0x92 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0x00,0x93 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x94 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x95 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x96 TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA SEED-SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x97 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x98 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
0x00,0x99 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA
0x00,0x9A TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
0x00,0x9B TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA ADH-SEED-SHA
0x00,0x9C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0x9D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0x9E TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0x9F TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0xA0 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA1 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xA2 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_DHE_DSS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA3 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0xA4 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA5 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xA6 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_DH_ANON_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA7 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0x00,0xA8 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_PSK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xA9 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xAA TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_DHE_PSK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xAB TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xAC TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x00,0xAD TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0x00,0xAE TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_PSK_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xAF TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0x00,0xB0 TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 TLS_PSK_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0xB1 TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0x00,0xB2 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_DHE_PSK_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xB3 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0x00,0xB4 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 TLS_DHE_PSK_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0xB5 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0x00,0xB6 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xB7 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0x00,0xB8 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
0x00,0xB9 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
0x00,0xBA TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBB TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBC TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBD TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBE TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xBF TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC0 TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 DES-CBC3-MD5
0x00,0xC1 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC2 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC3 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC4 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xC5 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
0x00,0xFF TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
0xC0,0x01 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x02 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x03 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x04 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x05 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x06 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-NULL-SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_NULL_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x07 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-RC4-SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x08 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x09 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x0A TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x0B TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDH-RSA-NULL-SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x0C TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDH-RSA-RC4-SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x0D TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x0E TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x0F TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x10 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA ECDHE-RSA-NULL-SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_NULL_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x11 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x12 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x13 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x14 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x15 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA AECDH-NULL-SHA TLS_ECDH_ANON_NULL_SHA1 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x16 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA AECDH-RC4-SHA TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x17 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA TLS_ECDH_ANON_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x18 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES128-SHA TLS_ECDH_ANON_AES_128_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x19 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA AECDH-AES256-SHA TLS_ECDH_ANON_AES_256_CBC_SHA1 TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x1A TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x1B TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x1C TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x1D TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x1E TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x1F TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x20 TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x21 TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x22 TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
0xC0,0x23 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x24 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x25 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256
0xC0,0x26 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x27 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x28 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x29 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256
0xC0,0x2A TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384
0xC0,0x2B TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x2C TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x2D TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x2E TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0xC0,0x2F TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x30 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x31 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x32 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
0xC0,0x33 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
0xC0,0x34 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_PSK_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1
0xC0,0x35 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_PSK_AES_128_CBC_SHA1
0xC0,0x36 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_ECDHE_PSK_AES_256_CBC_SHA1
0xC0,0x37 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x38 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x39 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
0xC0,0x3A TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_NULL_SHA256
0xC0,0x3B TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_NULL_SHA384
0xC0,0x3C TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x3D TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x3E TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x3F TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x40 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x41 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x42 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x43 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x44 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x45 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x46 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x47 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x48 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x49 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x4A TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x4B TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x4C TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x4D TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x4E TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x4F TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x50 TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x51 TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x52 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x53 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x54 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x55 TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x56 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x57 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x58 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x59 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x5A TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x5B TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x5C TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x5D TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x5E TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x5F TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x60 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x61 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x62 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x63 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x64 TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x65 TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x66 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x67 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x68 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x69 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x6A TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x6B TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x6C TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x6D TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x6E TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x6F TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x70 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x71 TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x72 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x73 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x74 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x75 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x76 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x77 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x78 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x79 TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x7A TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x7B TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x7C TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x7D TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x7E TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x7F TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x80 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x81 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x82 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x83 TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x84 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x85 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x86 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x87 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x88 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x89 TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x8A TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x8B TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x8C TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x8D TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x8E TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x8F TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x90 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x91 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x92 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
0xC0,0x93 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
0xC0,0x94 TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x95 TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x96 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x97 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x98 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x99 TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x9A TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
0xC0,0x9B TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
0xC0,0x9C TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0x9D TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0x9E TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0x9F TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xA0 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA1 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA2 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA3 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA4 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0xA5 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xA6 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM
0xC0,0xA7 TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM
0xC0,0xA8 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xA9 TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
0xC0,0xAA TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
0xC0,0xAB TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8

The table above was automatically generated by the script at https://github.com/jvehent/tlsnames/blob/master/build_correspondence_table.sh

GnuTLS ciphersuite

Unlike OpenSSL, GnuTLS will panic if you give it ciphers aren't supported by the library. That makes it very difficult to share a default ciphersuite to use in GnuTLS. The next best thing is using the following ciphersuite, and removing the components that break on your own version:

NONE:+VERS-TLS1.2:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.0:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-128-CBC:+AES-256-CBC:+SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+SIGN-RSA-SHA384:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-SHA224:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:+SIGN-DSA-SHA256:+SIGN-DSA-SHA224:+SIGN-DSA-SHA1:+CURVE-ALL:+AEAD:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA1:+COMP-NULL

A ciphersuite can be tested in GnuTLS using gnutls-cli.

$ gnutls-cli --version
gnutls-cli 3.1.26

$ gnutls-cli -l --priority NONE:+VERS-TLS1.2:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.0:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-128-CBC:+AES-256-CBC:+SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+SIGN-RSA-SHA384:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-SHA224:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:+SIGN-DSA-SHA256:+SIGN-DSA-SHA224:+SIGN-DSA-SHA1:+CURVE-ALL:+AEAD:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA1:+COMP-NULLCipher suites for NONE:+VERS-TLS1.2:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.0:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-128-CBC:+AES-256-CBC:+SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+SIGN-RSA-SHA384:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-SHA224:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:+SIGN-DSA-SHA256:+SIGN-DSA-SHA224:+SIGN-DSA-SHA1:+CURVE-ALL:+AEAD:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA1:+COMP-NULL
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256                    0xc0, 0x2f  TLS1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256                    0xc0, 0x27  TLS1.0
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1                      0xc0, 0x13  SSL3.0
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1                      0xc0, 0x14  SSL3.0
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256                      0x00, 0x9e  TLS1.2
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256                      0x00, 0x67  TLS1.0
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1                        0x00, 0x33  SSL3.0
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256                      0x00, 0x6b  TLS1.0
TLS_DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1                        0x00, 0x39  SSL3.0
TLS_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256                          0x00, 0x9c  TLS1.2
TLS_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA256                          0x00, 0x3c  TLS1.0
TLS_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1                            0x00, 0x2f  SSL3.0
TLS_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256                          0x00, 0x3d  TLS1.0
TLS_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1                            0x00, 0x35  SSL3.0

Certificate types: none
Protocols: VERS-TLS1.2, VERS-TLS1.1, VERS-TLS1.0
Compression: COMP-NULL
Elliptic curves: CURVE-SECP256R1, CURVE-SECP384R1, CURVE-SECP521R1
PK-signatures: SIGN-RSA-SHA256, SIGN-RSA-SHA384, SIGN-RSA-SHA512, SIGN-RSA-SHA224, SIGN-RSA-SHA1, SIGN-DSA-SHA256, SIGN-DSA-SHA224, SIGN-DSA-SHA1

A good way to debug the ciphersuite is by performing a test connection. If the ciphersuite isn't supported, gnutls-cli will stop reading it at the component that is causing the issue.

$ gnutls-cli --debug 9999 google.com --priority 'NONE:+VERS-TLS1.2:+VERS-TLS1.1:+VERS-TLS1.0:+ECDHE-RSA:+DHE-RSA:+RSA:+AES-128-GCM:+AES-128-CBC:+AES-256-CBC:+SIGN-RSA-SHA256:+SIGN-RSA-SHA384:+SIGN-RSA-SHA512:+SIGN-RSA-SHA224:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:+SIGN-DSA-SHA256:+SIGN-DSA-SHA224:+SIGN-DSA-SHA1:+CURVE-ALL:+AEAD:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA1:+COMP-NULL'
|<2>| ASSERT: gnutls_priority.c:812
Syntax error at: +SIGN-RSA-SHA224:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:+SIGN-DSA-SHA256:+SIGN-DSA-SHA224:+SIGN-DSA-SHA1:+SHA256:+SHA384:+SHA1:+COMP-NULL

In the example above, the component SIGN-RSA-SHA224 is not supported by this version of gnutls and should be removed from the ciphersuite.