CA/Forbidden or Problematic Practices: Difference between revisions

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=== Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal Domains ===
=== Issuing SSL Certificates for Internal Domains ===


There are various problems associated with issuing certificates for servers on internal networks under the same CA hierarchy as certificates for servers on public networks. Section 7 of [http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ Mozilla’s CA Certificate Policy]states that CAs need to take “reasonable measures to verify that the entity submitting the certificate signing request has registered the domain(s) referenced in the certificate.” Internal domain names such as non-valid TLDs, hostnames, and IP addresses technically do not meet this requirement. However, for business reasons there have been situations where these types of internal domain names have been allowed. In the future Mozilla may elect to update the enforcement of its policies and/or update the CA Certificate Policy to more specifically disallow internal (non-registered) domain names in SSL certificates.
It has come to our attention that some Certification Authorities may have mistakenly issued SSL certificates to non-existent .int domain names. This appears to have happened because the .int domain may have been confused with internal domain names, and not all of the CAs and RAs may be aware that .int is an ICANN approved TLD.  
 
Section 7 of Mozilla’s CA Certificate Policy states that CAs need to take “reasonable measures to verify that the entity submitting the certificate signing request has registered the domain(s) referenced in the certificate.” There are different interpretations as to what this means in regards to internal domain names such as non-valid TLDs, hostnames, and IP addresses. However, there is consensus that there are problems associated with issuing certificates for servers on internal networks under the same CA hierarchy as certificates for servers on public networks. Mozilla is currently discussing whether the CA Certificate Policy should be updated to add more explicit requirements on this practice, or even to disallow it altogether.


If you have issued certificates for internal domains within your CA hierarchy, Mozilla requests that you take the following actions:
If you have issued certificates for internal domains within your CA hierarchy, Mozilla requests that you take the following actions:
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Mozilla also recommends that you  
Mozilla also recommends that you  
# Implement automated checks to signal a red flag for domains such as .int and null characters in the Common Name and subjectAlternativeName of certificates.
# Implement automated checks to signal a red flag for domains such as .int and null characters in the Common Name and subjectAlternativeName of certificates.
# Track the [http://www.icann.org/en/registries/top-level-domains.htm ICANN list of TLDs] and update your procedures as necessary when new TLDs are approved.
# Maintain your own list of ICANN approved TLDs that are eligible to be used for domains in certificates issued within your CA hierarchy. If a new TLD is created by [http://www.icann.org/en/registries/top-level-domains.htm IANA], make an explicit decision whether or not to add the new TLD to your list.


=== OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root ===
=== OCSP Responses signed by a certificate under a different root ===
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